Coauthored by Saswati Sarkar, Shanmukh, and Dikgaj
In December 2019 India passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) which will offer citizenship to the refugees who had fled religious persecution in three neighboring Muslim majority countries, namely Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Protests all over India have erupted against this humanitarian act, populated primarily by Muslims and members of the opposition parties, such as the Communist Parties, Congress, Trinamul, DMK, Aam Admi Party etc. Amongst these opposition parties the Communists and Congress have national presence, and Communists have a disproportionate presence in the Universities and the intelligentsia. Thus the Communists could play a leading role in providing a secular cover and thereby lending legitimacy to a protest that is in reality sectarian Islamist. That the Communists have lent a secular legitimacy to an essentially Muslim protest has been acknowledged by journalist and anti CAA activist Saba Naqvi in an article endorsed (through a Twitter sharing) by CPIM politburo member Mohammad Salim [17]. Quoting Ms. Naqvi, “ The atrophied condition of the main opposition state parties such as the BSP, SP and Congress means that while the latter two have taken strong positions against the CAA and NRC, there were no social groups that they have been able to mobilise to join Muslims in protests. This image of ‘Muslim alone’ protest or ‘visibly Muslim’ attire and slogans suit the BJP…. Although communist parties are no longer a significant electoral force outside Kerala, their student organisations or just Left-leaning students have been volunteers in many protests, trying to nuance things in a way that it is presented as secular and a fight for the Constitution as opposed to the Islamist hues the BJP would like to paint the protests with. They are there at Jamia and Shaheen Bagh in Delhi, both symbols of continued resistance. Hence, the rage in ABVP/BJP/RSS against what they see as the coming together of Muslims and Left tactics and symbols of protest.’’ [17]. A Hindustan Times article reiterates the above point of view, when it writes that “the bulk of the numbers [in the anti-CAA protests] have come from Muslims, while the narrative has been led by Left- liberals. Third, now that the protests are completing two months, there’s the sense that the positive outreach has not been able to go beyond their initial constituency’’ [8]. This prompts us to review if this conduct of the Communists have any historical precedent, and we find that serving as the fifth column in struggle against invaders have been their role right from their start in India. We retrace their evolution from the formation of the Communist Party of India (CPI) (1919-1925), when India was still a British colony, to freedom and partition of India in 1947 to make our case. The CPI adopted the stated policy of anti-imperialism, which ought to translate to opposition to the British in the immediate Indian context given that India was part of the Bitish empire then. But, as it happened, it sabotaged the Indian freedom movement at every turn. We document the pages of this saga of betrayal that have remained obscure in public memory.
We first provide a brief recapitulation of the foreign policy dynamics between Great Britain and Soviet Russia between 1918 to 1935, as this would have important bearing on the policies that CPI adopted vis a vis the Indian Freedom movement. Summarily, we show that the relations between the USSR and Britain were frosty until 1929 and subsequently underwent a marked improvement in 1933-34, due to fear of Hitler. The subsequent negotiations between the two led the Comintern and the capitalist West jointly decide on a ‘united front’ strategy against fascism (Section A).
Second, we show how right from the start the CPI was under the thumbnails of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), a little known facet of history. After Lenin’s death, Stalin’s Russia transformed the Comintern, the global body of Communism, stationed in Russia, to an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. The Comintern reverted to their old Caucasian biases and handed over CPI to the CPGB, which was not required to be as subservient to the Comintern as the CPI, perhaps given their race. The handover became complete by 1935, when the Soviet Russia and Great Britain decided to form a `united front’ strategy against fascism. While Russia and the Comintern remained a remote overlord of the CPI, the direct control was exerted by the CPGB, who laid down the operational policies of the CPI, interpreted the guidelines of the Comintern as they saw, and passed on specific operational instructions to the CPI, which they had to follow. The CPI’s stated uncompromising fight against imperialism, that is, their attempt to overthrow the British rule, was entirely guided by the leading lights of the CPGB, namely ideologues like Rajani Palme Dutt, Ben Bradley and practitioners like Harry Pollitt. The conflict of interest in this case should have set alarm bell ringings throughout the Indian left, comprising of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress Socialist Party etc., other than the CPI. But it did not, as Nehru and the leading lights of CSP were deeply entrenched in the web of the British Left in which CPGB was an influential bloc. But the conflict of interest existed nonetheless – through natural loyalties of British nationals to their home country and through the control of the British state on them, direct or indirect. Another lesser known fact of history was that the leadership of the CPI comprised primarily of the Marathis and Hindi speakers based in Bombay. It is this leadership that was close to the CPGB, and led the CPI’s various compromises (Section B).
We next document how imperialist Great Britain furthered the growth of the supposed anti-imperialist CPI, which explains why CPI would act as the fifth column in India’s freedom struggle. First, the British Government of India had arrested and tried a group of early Indian communists in the Meerut conspiracy case. This group included members of the CPGB (such as Ben Bradley) indicating close connection between the CPI and the CPGB. The under-trials in the Meerut conspiracy case were tried for trade union activities, and not for seeking freedom of India. While the British Government was harsh with the under-trials early on, they released all the convicts shortly after they received long sentences. We show that the relation between Britain and the stated Communist fatherland, Russia, improved exactly during this period. The released convicts formed the nucleus of the CPI leadership in subsequent future. The British Government of India however remained suspicious of the CPI owing to its allegiance to Russia, and stopped it from becoming a revolutionary mass movement through the institution of a ban. But, rather than crushing the CPI, a treatment that the British had reserved for the organizations it dreaded, such as the revolutionary freedom fighting organizations, they allowed a controlled growth of the CPI, and looked the other way while it received funds from abroad and spread its tentacles in various political and semi-political blocs in India, like the Congress Socialist party, the Congress, the various trade-unions etc. Subsequently, the same Government helped CPI operatives indoctrinate freedom fighting revolutionaries in various jails in India towards communism; the modalities of the conversion to Communism resembled those deployed by the Missionaries of various religions, namely the Sufis and the Christian Missionaries (Section C) . Interestingly, none of those who joined the CPI engaged in revolutionary activities subsequently, and CPI as an organization never participated in any mass freedom movement or perpetrated revolutionary resistance against the British in India at any point in future – notwithstanding the fact that the Communist Parties exploit their names till date as evidences of their nationalism, their glorious history of fighting for India’s freedom. The association of the revolutionary vanguard with the CPI enhanced its legitimacy among the youth with natural propensity towards radicalism, and diverted this invaluable manpower to the ally, or shall we say the Sufis, of British imperialism, effectively striking a death-blow at the revolutionary movement in India from the 1930s. In a sequel, we show that some of the revolutionary freedom fighters who had joined the CPI would be utilized to sabotage the freedom fight against the British through both discourse and actual acts.
Since CPI’s stated objective was anti-imperialism, one would expect that it would work in close collaboration with a staunch anti-imperialist like Subhas Chandra Bose. Instead, we show that
ideological and political conflicts between Bose and the CPI recurred throughout the 1930s. The resistance to Bose from within the CPI emanated definitely from the Bombay wing, which was closest to the CPGB. The relation between Bose and the CPGB had also been uneasy and involved mutual suspicion. Notably, Bose perceived India’s freedom fight as a civilizational conflict between India and Britain, and did not distinguish between the British right and the British left (CPGB was a part of the latter) in his end to liberate India. We focus on the time period just preceding the Second World War, namely 1938-39. Germany had a no-aggression pact with Russia then. Hence, the CPI was officially opposed to the British and their war efforts. During this period, Subhas Chandra Bose was trying to get Congress serve an ultimatum to the British to leave India, and launch a mass movement against them from the Congress platform if they do not respond satisfactorily. The right wing (Gandhian) leadership of the Congress refused to comply with Bose, and thereby facilitate the British imperialism. Under the instruction of the CPGB, and in the guise of unity with the anti-imperialist forces (read Gandhian Congress), the CPI sought to further the Gandhian line and sabotage Bose, thereby in effect furthering British imperialism. Other eminent members of the Indian left, such as the CSP and Jawaharlal Nehru were in the same boat as the CPI. The disagreement between the Indian left leadership and Subhas Chandra Bose boiled down to the latter’s insistence on issuing a time-bound ultimatum to the British should they not comply with the demand to liberate India within the specified time-bound. The CPI effort in this part was led by its Bombay wing again. But at Tripuri Congress 1939 the Bengal cadres forced the leadership to support Bose, through an open revolt. CSP, however, comprised of the bulk of the Congress left, and their cooperation with Gandhi rendered it impossible for Bose to get Congress deliver any ultimatum to the British. Bose was forced to resign from Congress presidency which he had won fair and square against Gandhian proxy (Part II).
After resigning formed Congress, Bose formed a left consolidation committee (LCC) comprising of CSP, National Front (CPI), Royists, his own Forward Bloc and the Kisan Sabhas – the goal of the left consolidation committee was to oppose any compromise with British imperialism. Around that time the Second World War commenced, and during the early part of the Second World War, the Congress leadership (namely Gandhi and his coterie involving Patel, Rajagopalachari, Nehru, Kripalni etc) was favorably disposed towards the British. Through a carrot and stick policy pursued by the British and the Congress leadership in tandem, other than the Forward Bloc Kisan Sabhas, all the other components of the LCC, namely the CPI, CSP were weaned off exactly at the time at which Bose sought to launch an organized movement to force Congress’ hand and launch an all-out movement against the British (the Royists had left even earlier). The CPI and the CSP embarked on a virulent propaganda against Bose, and sought to sabotage Bose’s attempts to force the Congress’ hand (Part II).
In 1941 January Bose escaped to Europe, through the North West Frontier and Kabul, during his flight he was facilitated by the Forward Bloc units in NWFP, the Kirti Kisan Party (with strong Communist connection) of Punjab, and one particular individual, Bhagat Ram Talwar in particular. Middle of 1941, Germany attacked Russia. Soon, the CPI reversed its official stand of opposing the British war efforts, yet again, under the express orders of the CPGB. Russia was not in direct contact with the CPI during the Second World War. Talwar switched loyalty to Russia too. Bose had been counting on him to serve as his agent in the North West Frontier, towards fomenting tribal unrest, sabotaging British war efforts, passing on his instructions to his Bengal base and information about Bengal and the rest of India to him. Talwar put up an appearance of doing all these, but in reality handed over the money, equipments he received from the German agent to Russia and suppressed all the information he was expected to pass on to Bengal and fed false information about British war efforts to Bose under Russian instruction. The Bengal revolutionary base of Bose which was still operational outside British jails refused to join Talwar’s sabotage, there is also no mention of any Bengali Communist directly siding with him during this time. The Russians wanted to have two Indian Communists to travel to Burma, and directed Talwar to the Bombay wing of CPI for this. We notice the Bombay hand yet again. We next visit the infamous campaign of calumny against Subhas Chandra Bose by the CPI. We show that it was again rooted in the Bombay wing of the CPI, with some minimal contributions from Bengal and South India. The leading figures of this campaign of calumny were also exactly those who facilitated Muslim League in its creation of Pakistan (Part III).
By 1942, given Japan’s rapid advances up to the Indian frontier, one part of the Congress right wing (namely Gandhi, Patel) decided to adopt a stringent anti-British line to hedge their bet should Japan displace the British from India. The result was the announcement of the Quit India struggle. The CPI opposed this call, both from within the Congress Working Committee and publicly, and in fact sought to sabotage some of the programs therein. The CPI also enlisted some of the Bengal revolutionaries in its heinous effort – these have earlier been broken in dreaded British jails like Cellular through prolonged torture and accompanying indoctrination. We describe how the British facilitated this indoctrination, and the outcome thereof in which the once dreaded revolutionaries of the Raj, issued statements from jails calling upon the nation to suspend their freedom struggle and join the British war. The British publicized their statements but continued to confine many of them well beyond the end of the war. Some of the revolutionaries were however released earlier, and some of those freed sought to organize efforts in the Bengal frontier under the auspices of the CPI to resist Japan should it arrive (Part III).
This is where we pause and briefly point to those who shared the vices of the CPI in various time periods. The object is manifold. First, it is tempting to judge the above-referenced revolutionaries, the same men who voluntarily sacrificed immensely for their nation, by their last act of surrender. It is also facile to blame their acts on the adoption of Marxism – that is, retire into the lazy, comforting world of labels. We therefore show that for all but one of these steps of the CPI, the actions of the Congress Right Wing and/or Hindu Mahasabha luminaries provided exact parallels. We choose these two as many leaders of these had fiercely opposed Marxism, had either never been to jail, or been only to jails that were luxury resorts in comparison to Cellular. The last two ensure that their sacrifice for India were nowhere comparable to those of the above-mentioned revolutionaries, and they colluded without being subjected to the argument of force, in any considerable degree. We refer to Gobind Ballabh Pant, Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajagopalachari as representatives of the Congress Right Wing and Syamaprasad Mookerjee as the representative of the Hindu Mahasabha. We will show that with regards to collusion with the British during the Second World War, Syamaprasad Mookerjee was far better than those leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha, who had had suffered extended stints in Cellular, namely Savarkar and Bhai Paramanand, owing to their revolutionary activities before and during the First World War. These two were not in the influence sphere of communism either. We will also refer to a group of Anushilan Samiti revolutionaries, who formed a party called the R.S.P.I. that adopted Marxism as its guiding doctrine, but pursued courses of action that were striking contrast to the CPI’s until at least 1947. Their choices were much more patriotic and far less collusive than those of the Congress Right Wing’s or the Hindu Mahasabha’s, or the RSS’ during this period. Thus, labels can not be defining attributes, actions must be (Part III).
We finally point out in which respects the collusion of the CPI with the British damaged the Indian freedom struggle more than that of the Congress Right Wing and the Hindu Mahasabha. The Indian freedom struggle had primarily proceeded through the fear created by the armed wing in the psyche of the British. It is this fear that had forced the British to strike bargains with the non-violent wing and provide concessions that took India closer to freedom. The armed freedom movement organically attracted the Hindu radicals, who would find nothing in common with the Congress right wing or the Hindu Mahasabha given their constitutionalist approach. But, the revolutionary discourse of the Communists would naturally appeal to the radical section. In the words of Harkishan Singh Surjeet, who served as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) from 1992 to 2005 and was a member of the party’s Political Bureau from 1964 to 2008, when he passed away, “Peoples of colonial countries struggling against domination, saw in the revolution [in Russia in October, 1917] a reliable friend and ally in their struggles for national liberation. The October Revolution profoundly stirred the national aspirations of oppressed peoples all over the world. Communist Parties began to grow in many parts of the world. In the period between 1918 and 1931 in nearly a dozen countries communist parties came into existence. These included, Turkey, Indonesia, China, India, Japan, Burma, Philippines etc.‘’ [25].Thus, the radical demographics who would have provided manpower to the revolutionary freedom movement in normal course were diverted towards the Communist fifth column. This constituted immeasurable damage to the freedom movement notwithstanding the fact that the Communists were farther off from the center of power than the Congress right wing. It is also worth noting that the principal actors of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress Socialist Party have some redeeming acts to their credit, eg, Syamaprasad Mookerjee’s opposition to the Nehru-Liaquat Pact (with its demographic implications that India is suffering till date) and the separation of Kashmir from Indian mainstream, Savarkar’s contribution to Hindu intellectual formulations, the CSP’s organization of the mass and underground resistances during the Quit India, etc. But, the Communists have none.
Last, but not the least, it is important to acknowledge that Communism in India is now history. Communists (CPI-CPIM) comprise about 1% of the current Lok Sabha. They are part of the government in only 1 state in India – Kerala. Electoral trajectories indicate that by middle of 2021 they would not be the principal ruling party in any state in India. Yet, it is important to internalize their history of collusion with invaders, because the supposed liberal wing of politics in India (namely Congress, TMC, and most other regional opposition parties) are but their ideological re-incarnations. In this sense, the stand on CAA provides a demarcating line. The parties that opposed the CAA in Parliament are in the left or liberal wing. The secular commentariat recognizes this classification by hyphenating left with liberals (eg, [8]). We need to carefully dissect what is it that drew a considerable section of our populace towards Communism, and gradually nudged the active participants including the freedom fighting revolutionaries towards being party to out and out anti-national and anti-Hindu stands (such as becoming instruments of British imperialism or ideological supporters of partition of India). The initial point was always unexceptionable positioning, as unity of working class all over India against exploiting classes, or unity against fascism, imperialism, etc. That the actions became facilitation of British imperialism or partition of India became merely necessary evils in minds deceived with noble messaging and in some cases under excruciating circumstances (such as soul-detroying torture in British jails). The parallels with the current liberal politics are unmistakable. The positioning are invariably inspiring objectives such as global humanism, Hindu-Muslim brotherhood, retrieving the soul of India, reclaiming the republic, upholding the Constitution of India, patriotism of waiving the national flag, singing the national anthem, etc. But, without fail, these are invoked to further the interests of violent Islamism – a case in point is how the left-liberal crowd and the Muslims together hit the streets opposing humanitarian gestures towards the Indic victims of religious persecution in form of the CAA. This crowd was only conspicuous by its absence when for example, the indigenuous Hindu micro-minority was hounded out of Kashmir, the indigenuous Indic Bru-Reang tribes were expelled from Mizoram, the detention centers of Assam have been populated by poor Hindus. Thus, in terms of socio-religious and cultural agenda, Communism is indistinguishable from current liberalism; the difference is only in their economic policies. It is therefore time to uncover the masks of such toxic fifth column through large scale dissemination of and internalization of the lesson that relatively recent history has to offer.
Section A: The Communist Party of India, the Communist International and the Geo-politics of Great Britain and Soviet Russia
The Communist Party of India (CPI) was formally formed in 1920 or 1925 depending on the event we consider as its start. On October 17, 1920, following the initiative of M. N. Roy, the CPI was founded at Tashkent [25].The CPI, however, has officially stated that it was formed on 26 December 1925 at the first Party Conference in Kanpur. From its beginning it was subservient to the Global Communist Body, known as the Communist International, or the Comintern, stationed in Soviet Russia. Historian Bipan Chandra, who has been at the forefront of many Communist movements in India, had described the relation between the CPI and the Comintern: “…the Party (CPI) worked under several handicaps. Firstly, they were not free agents. It was difficult and even impossible to avoid the Communist International’s or Comintern’s control in the 1920s and 1930s even though the Comintern’s control was increasingly dysfunctional as it had increasingly come under the control of the Soviet Union and Stalin. Secondly, the Comintern was utterly ignorant of the political and social structure and situation of Asia in general and India in particular. It was difficult and impossible for any Communist Party to survive in opposition to the Comintern and Stalin in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s and even 1950s. After all, the Soviet Party was the legitimate heir of Lenin and of a Party and country which had made the only successful socialist revolution. ’’ [13].
Stalin assumed power in Moscow in 1924, and in his regime, gradually Comintern started framing its policies in accordance only with the interests of Soviet Russia and the needs of its foreign policy. For example, historian of the Revolutionary Socialist Party of India (RSPI), Buddhadeb Bhattacharyya has noted that the leaders of the RSPI who were first-hand witnesses of this era had observed the impact of this transformation of the Comintern on the policies of the CPI at least since 1928-1929: “After prolonged debates and discussions (by 1935-36), Anushilanites who were by that time convinced of Marxism-Leninism clearly felt that the CI [Comintern] had lost its internationalist character and transformed itself into an agency for carrying out the foreign policy-line of the Soviet Union and that the CPI’s policy of shift from ‘left sectarianism’ of 1928/29-34 to ‘United front’ tactics of 1935 was not the product of its own independent judgment of the correlationship of class forces in the country vis-a-vis imperialism but of its unquestioned, uncritical allegiance to the dictates from the international centre’’ p. 28, [9]. On 15 February 1939, a British Indian Home Department note on the Communist activity in India records that “The CPI is ‘a section of the Communist International’, and owes full allegiance to Moscow…. The Central Committee’s first duty is to obey instructions received from abroad’’ p. 1511, [21]. Since CPI operated in India and India was ruled by Great Britain until 1947, it is imperative that we briefly examine the dynamics between Great Britain and Soviet Russia during the 1920s and the 1930s, that is, during the early years of the CPI.
In the aftermath of the First World War (WW1 ended in 1918), there was a serious animosity between the Soviets and the British. Britain intervened in the Soviet Civil War, trying to topple the Bolsheviks from power, but when this failed, the relations were cold. There was no overt intervention by Briain in Soviet Union, but the relations were frosty, despite rising Soviet-British business in the 1920s. However, the British Conservative party and the British Foreign Office regarded those who did business in Soviet Union frostily and the India Office railed against communist propaganda [20]. In 1926, the Profintern, the Soviet international of trade unions, intervened in British strikes, and the anger and mistrust between the two countries deepened.
However, things would change by the late 1920s. In the Soviet Union, Stalin was firmly in the saddle by this time, and the Labour government in Britain established full and formal diplomatic relations in 1929. Nevertheless, the relations between the two countries still remained frosty. The official Soviet propaganda still railed against British imperialism, and the British press was full of derision and contempt for the Soviets. These would change starting with the rise of Hitler in 1933.
In the aftermath of the First World War, the Germans and the Soviets had signed the treaty of Rapallo, and Germany was the only European country with which the Soviets had decent relations. However, with the advent of Hitler, this was beginning to fray. The ‘Rapallo policy’ was under deep stress by Hitler’s rants against Communism in the Soviet Union [20]. In October 1933, the Germans withdrew from the disarmament negotiations and the League of Nations, even as he professed only peaceful intentions. Nevertheless, the significance of the German withdrawal from these obligations were not lost on the Russians or the British. Both began to negotiate much more seriously. On the British side, the biggest supporter for better relations with Soviet Union were Winston Churchill and Robert Vansittart, while on the Soviet side, it was headed by Litvninov and the Soviet ambassador in London, Maiskii. Swiftly, Litvninov offered concessions. The Metro-Vickers affair, in which some British engineers had been arrested by the Soviets, was settled to Britain’s satisfaction in February 1934, and Soviet newspapers like Izvestia were openly calling for improved relations like Britain. By early March 1934, Maiskii was reporting “an anti-adventurist, realistic frame of mind’ in the Tory party in the House of Commons” [20]. On 21 June [1934], Commisar Litvinov met with Chilston in Moscow, and Litvinov emphasised the need for better political relations between Moscow and London [20]. The continuing negotiations resulted in ``Vansittart [giving] assurances of British Government support for Soviet entry into the League and for an Eastern security pact, which the French were hard promoting. And when Maiskii raised the issue of British press hostility, Vansittart said that the press was independent and not guided by the British Government. Maiskii referred to the Times, known for its pro-German line; Vansittart replied that he entirely disagreed with the attitude of the Times towards Germany.” [20].
However, the Soviet press’ harsh attitude towards Britain and its colonial policy was a serious irritant and Vansittart wrote, “I shall also tell M. Maisky the next time I see him that its of no use whatever to speak of improved relations in one breath and to blackguard us systematically with the other – despite my very friendly response to his advances…. The Soviet Government cannot in fact have it both ways, and they have now got to choose. They will never reassure the public here of their friendly intentions if they go on with this nonsense. If they want better relations – for which we are quite ready – they must be reasonably polite to and reasonably truthful about us.” [20]. This was brought up in the next discussion with Maiskii and Maiskii replied, ``I understand your concerns, but I have to say that it was only two weeks ago that I had the opportunity to hear an explanation from a responsible Foreign Office representative, of the point of view of the British government on the most important international issues” [20]. Maiskii averred that it would take time for Soviet opinion to note the change in British policy. “The history of Anglo-Soviet relations had created great mistrust: . . . it cannot vanish at once, overnight” [20]. Maiskii was as good as his word. On 7 August [1934] Chilston reported “a marked improvement in the tone of the Soviet press towards Great Britain, even if occasionally, there were lapses.” [20]. Vansittart also remarked the marked improvement [20]. With British support, on 18 September 1934 the USSR was admitted to the League of Nations, to the mutual
delight of Vansittart and Litvinov. Thus, the relations between the USSR and Britain underwent a marked improvement in 1933-34, due to fear of Hitler.
On 28th May 1935, Vansittart, taking the cue, objected subsidies for the British communist paper the Daily Worker. Vansittart said, “There’s no use in denying it. The matter was not open to argument. The subsidies are waste of money and self-defeating on the level of high policy which should not be occupied with or disturbed by petty considerations.” [20] To quote Carley, “Propaganda was never far from the Foreign Office mind; it hung like a millstone round the neck.” [20]. Hoare, the new Foreign Secretary, noted that, “I thought it worth telling him [Maiskii]that it would be extremely difficult to persuade the Conservatives in this country to accept a pro-Russian policy if the Soviet Government failed to eliminate the source of trouble that had often poisoned our relations in the past.” [20] A cabinet paper acknowledged that “Communist propaganda, though probably ineffective in this country, remains a considerable danger in other parts of the Empire, particularly India.” [20]. The end effect of these negotiations was that the Comintern went over to the capitalist West calling for a ‘united front’ strategy against fascism [20].
We next document how the policies of the CPI were determined in accordance with the above dynamics between Great Britain and Soviet Russia through the intermediary of Comintern and the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB).
Section B: The Subservience of the Communist Party of India to the Communist party of Great Britain
The Communist Party of India (CPI) had close connections with the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) from the start. Soon CPGB acquired complete control over the CPI. We trace the genesis of this dominance of the CPGB over the CPI as this would make a mockery of the latter’s supposed stances against imperialism.
Historian Bipan Chandra had noted the poor stature of the CPI in the Comintern in the 1920s and the 1930s: “Secondly, unlike other major Parties in the Afro-Asian countries, the CPI had no representative of its own in the Comintern Headquarters in Moscow’’ [13]. In contrast, the CPGB (Communist Party of Great Britain) was powerful within the Comintern, particularly with respect to the British colonies like India. The CPGB was entrenched within the British left, which was powerful in England and exerted influence on the British intelligentsia. For example, many of its founder members like Emile Burns, Rajani Palme Dutt, J. Walton Newbold, Helen Crawfurd, Shapurji Dorabji Saklatvala (grand-nephew of Jamshedji Tata), were originally members of the Independent Labor Party of Great Britain p. 26, [31], and some of them like Saklatvala contested elections and became members of British Parliament, officially endorsed by the Labour Party of Great Britain p. 188, [31]. Local labour party activists campaigned for all CPGB candidates contesting elections even when they were not officially endorsed by the labour party (eg, in November, 1923) p. 242, [31]. As John Callaghan has written, “the CPGB was part of a complex web of relationships that connected Moscow with the national movement in the colonies [eg, India]. The British party should not be regarded as the mere conveyor of the Russian line’’ [22].
In 1925 itself the Comintern had assigned the CPGB the role of guiding Indian Communism. A founder member and leading theoretician of CPGB, Rajani Palme-Dutt had emerged as the leading India expert of CPGB with a book on the topic and as an expert of Indian political economy [22]. To understand the dominance of the CPGB over the CPI, note that Indian Communists in London pressed for the formation of a Colonial Bureau comprising of representatives from all subject nationalities within the British Empire, which acts in conjunction with, but independent of the CPGB. The Colonial bureau was then functioning under the supervision of the CPGB p. 202, [11]. In 1925 a group of Indian residents in England formed a Colonial Bureau independent of the CPGB, presumably because of their dissatisfaction with the colonial work of the latter. On 6.7.1925 this group asked for affiliation with the CPI in Moscow p. 203, [11]. But, on 15.9.25, Comintern ruled that the Indian communists resident in Britain should have their party membership transferred to the CPGB during their sojourn in Britain. The Indian Communist Group in Britain were not given affiliation to the CPI independent of the control of the CPGB, and was brought under the dual control of the latter’s Colonial Commission and the European bureau of the CPI. p. 205, [11]. M. N. Roy wrote to Petroff of the Comintern on Dec. 30, likely 1925: “… we are informed by the British party that the representative there has come back from Moscow with new instructions which reject entirely the line we have been following up till now. According to these new instructions, the Colonial Commission of the British Party assumes the supreme political responsibility for the work in India, Egypt and other colonies….The British party starts with the assumption that since they have not done anything in India, nothing whatsoever exists there, and that they must begin the whole thing.” pp. 205-206, [11]. This letter indicates how the Comintern was increasingly recognizing the CPGB as the decisive authority regarding India p. 206, [11]. On 13.2.28 the Comintern proposed to organize an Indian Sub-Commission in the CPGB and in effect recognized the CPGB as the key factor in shaping its policy concerning India p. 267, [11]. In fact, Harkishan Singh Surjeet has these to say about the relation between the CPGB and the CPI:
- “One cannot forget the role that the Communist Party of Great Britain, despite being weak, played in helping the Indian movement. They were in constant touch with the Communist Party of India from 1926 onwards. Many of them were directly involved in the movement. One of them was Rajni Palme Dutt. An important leader of the C.P.G.B, he wrote India Today, which remains a classic in understanding British India and the exploitation indulged in by the British. The British Party also influenced Indian students who were studying there. Many of these students joined the movement after returning to India. Many members of the C.P.G.B came to India (some were sent by the Communist International)to help us. Some came under assumed names and worked in the trade unions and other organisations. Some were even arrested by the British government. Among those who came here were Ben Bradley, Philip Spratt, George Allison [pseudonym of J. R. Campbell] etc. Some were implicated in the Meerut Conspiracy case also. It were all these trends that combined together to take the Communist Party forward’’ [25].
- “The Communist Party of Great Britain had been playing an important role in the development of the working class movement and the Communist Party in our country since the days of its formation in 1920, vehemently supporting the cause of complete independence from British imperialism. It sent many comrades to work in the trade union movement and three of them were also implicated in the Meerut Conspiracy Case, which was aimed at suppressing the communist movement in the country. The role of both Rajni Palme Dutt and Ben Bradley was very significant in this context. In fact Rajni Palme Dutt had undertaken a deep study of the economic structure in India prevailing at that time and gave a detailed analysis of the classes that are interested in maintaining British imperialist rule as well as the conditions and role of the overwhelming majority of the Indian population — working class, peasantry, intelligentsia, other sections of the middle class, which though vacillating plays its role at different stages. His book “India Today” has been a classical text not only for the communists but for all progressive forces in India.’’ [7]. In the next section, we would dwell on what the CPGB’s version of “ complete independence from British imperialism’’ meant.
As per a Home Department note on 15 February, 1939, Shapurji Saklatvala (1874-1936), a founder member of the CPGB who grew up in Bombay, had founded “an Indian students’ secret Communist group in England’’, which acted “ under the directions of British Communist leaders’’, and this group “supplied most of the present leaders of the Communist movement ‘’ p. 1511, [21].
Communism in India was incidentally founded in Bombay, and before independence, the leadership and the ideological center were both stationed there. In Indian Struggle, Subhas Babu has specifically traced the origin of Communism to Bombay, and noted that it could not make the same headway in his home province, Bengal, due to the predominance of revolutionary nationalism there: “Being dissatisfied with the Gandhian ideology, a small group in Bombay under the leadership of Mr. Dange, took to studying Socialist literature. They had a club of their own and published a weekly journal for preaching socialism. Among the Congress leaders the only patron they had at the time was the late Mr. Vithalbhai Patel. They soon took up Labour organization in Bombay and before many years elapsed, they became the first group of Communists in India. Following Bombay, a similar group was started some time later in Bengal under the name of the “Workers’ and Peasants’ Party” – but it was never able to acquire as much importance or make as much headway as the Bombay Group. The reason is not far to seek. Bengal, of which Calcutta is both the heart and the brain, has for a very long time been one of the strongholds of the nationalist movement. There the movement is based on an influential and patriotic petit-bourgeois class. Moreover, Bengal does not possess an indigenous and influential capitalist class, as does Bombay. Consequently, class-differentiation has never appeared in Bengal in that sharp and acute form in which it has appeared in Bombay. The petit-bourgeois element is not so strong or influential in Bombay as it is in Bengal. In these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the intellectual revolt against Gandhism in Bombay should take a Socialist or Communist turn. In Bengal, on the other hand, the revolt against Gandhism took a revolutionary more than a Communist turn’’ pp. 98-99, [6].
We consider an ethno-religious demographic decomposition of the Indian Communists who were tried in the Meerut Conspiracy case in 1929: Muzaffar Ahmad (Muslim Bengali), S.A. Dange (Marathi), S.V. Ghate (From South India but lived in Bombay), K.N. Joglekar (Marathi, Bombay), R.S. Nimbkar (Marathi, Bombay), S. S. Mirajkar (Bombay), Shaukat Usmani (Muslim from Bikaner, lived in Bombay), Mir Abdul Majid (Muslim, Lahore), Sohan Singh Josh (Punjabi), Dharanikanta Goswami (Hindu bengali), Ajodhya Prasad (Central Province), G. Adhikari (Marathi), P.C . Joshi (United Province)., M.G. Desai (Bombay), Gopen Chakraborty (Hindu Bengali), Gopal Chandra Basak (Hindu Bengali) , Radha Raman Mitra (Hindu Bengali), Shivavakash Hormarji Jhabwala (Parsee, Bombay), Kedar Nath Sehgal (Punjabi), Shamsul Huda (Bengali Muslim), Arjun Atmaram Alve (Bombay), Gobinda Ramchandra Kasle (Bombay), Gouri Shankar (United Provinces), Lakshman Rao Kadam (United Provinces), D. R Thengdi (Bombay), Biswanath Mukherjee (Hindu Bengali), Sibnath Banerjee (Hindu Bengali), Kishorilal Ghose (Hindu Bengali). There are 12 from Bombay, while 8 are from Bengal, of which 6 are Hindu Bengalis, 3 are from United Province, 3 are from Punjab, 1 is from central Province [26], [33].
Scholar Purabi Roy has collected a list of prominent CPI and trade union leaders in India enumerated in the Russian archives in the 1930s: pp. 271-276, [10]:Sardesai (Marathi), Majid (Punjab), G. Adhikari (Marathi), Sohan Singh Josh (Punjabi), Ramkrishna (Punjabi Hindu), Jambedkar (Marathi), P. C. Joshi (U.P., but functioned from Bombay in the mid-1930s), S. V. Ghate (From South India but lived in Bombay), Ajoy Ghosh (Hindu Bengali), S. S. Mirajkar (Bombay), J. Adhikari (Marathi, Brother of G. Adhikari), Ajodhya Prasad (Central Province), Jaywant (Central Province, Nagpur), B. Kulkarni (Marathi, Bombay), Dutt Mazumdar (Hindu Bengali), Bharadwaj (United Provinces), Patkar (Marathi, Bombay) , Joglekar (Marathi, Bombay), Bukhari, Baltiwalla (Parsee, Bombay) , Vaidya (Marathi, Bombay), S. P. Bhose (Bombay), S. S. Zaheer (Allahabad), Ahmed (United Provinces), Dr. Ashraf (United Provinces), Samdari (President of Madras TUC), Satya Ghosh (Hindu Bengali), Dr. Sen (Hindu Bengali), Muzaffar Ahmed (Muslim Bengali). Worthwhile to note that only 4 among 29 of these names are Hindu Bengali, and a predominant component comprised of Marathis or those functioning from the Bombay Presidency and surrounding regions. Also note that G. Adhikari is the one of “Pakistan and Indian National unity’’ fame – this article published in 1943 constituted one of the early supports for partition of India – he happens to be a Marathi, p. 250, [4]. Other eminent leaders associated with early Communism, who have not been mentioned above are S. A. Dange (Marathi), B. T. Ranadive (Marathi) , P. Sundarayya (Tamizh) and E. M. S. Namboodiripad (Malayalee).
Bipan Chandra mentions that CPI had moved its headquarters from Calcutta to Bombay after formation of the Congress ministry there in 1937 [13]. On 15 February, 1939, a note from the British Home Department in India stated that the Central Committee of the CPI functioned from the Bombay headquarters, and “Bombay is referred to by one of them recently as the ‘Red Capital’ ‘’ p. 1508, [21]. The same note states that “the main Communism centers in India are—as they have been since the early twenties when Communist first came to India— Bombay, Punjab, UP, Bengal and Madras ‘’ p. 1511, [21].
Initially, CPGB was probably closer to the Bombay wing of the CPI than the Bengal wing. Shapurji Saklatvala (1874-1936), a founder member of the CPGB, was born and educated at Bombay. A member of the Tata family, he had joined Tata Sons, Bombay, and had founded the Tata Iron and Steel Works, and was associated with welfare work in the hospitals and slums of Bombay. He went to London in 1905, but maintained association with the working classes of India and attended the seventh AITUC session, Delhi, 1927 p. 1513, [35]. Recall that as per a Home Department note on 15 February, 1939, an Indian students’ secret Communist group in England that he had founded, which acted under the directions of CPGB leadership, supplied most of the present leaders of the Communist movement p. 1511, [21]. On 29 May, 1939, notes sent by the British Intelligence Bureau in India to K. M. Munshi, the minister of the Bombay province, show that CPGB would send funds directly to the Bombay unit of the CPI: “The instructions to the CPI come through the GB, Communist Party (Great Britain). In the latter part of 1938 about Rs 20,000 were received in Bombay’’ p. 1617, [18].
Then, on 11th October, 1928, S. M. Shamsul Huda wrote to the Comintern that the Bengal wing of the CPI was vehemently opposed to his communication through CPGB. p. 341, [11]. The CPGB had recommended that the Communists, or a section thereof, work within the Indian National Congress [22]. In accordance with this line, the Bombay Worker and the Peasant Party resolved that its members and sympathizes would join the Congress and become members of the provincial and All-India Congress Committees to give a lead, and actively participate in its mass movements. They would cooperate with the Congress while it fights imperialism, but criticize its compromises p. 322, [11].
But the CPGB’s line was rejected in the sixth Comintern Congress of 1928 [22], and the Comintern declared Gandhi and Nehru as “agents of imperialism, who had to be opposed tooth and nail if the masses were to be freed from their influence and if the anti-imperialist struggle was to grow.’’ [13]. On cue, the CPI publicly continued to excoriate Nehru, Bose, as “the worst kind of national reformists’’ p. 130, [30] until 1933 p. 134, [30], two years before the line was officially reversed. As Druhe observes, “ In March 1932, a draft program of the `Young Communist League of India’ appeared in the `International Press Correspondence’. … The program castigated Jawaharlal Nehru and Bose, holding them to be the `the most dangerous enemies in the struggle for independence’ because they were `dulling the consciousness of the youth through their revolutionary phrases.’ ‘’ p. 133 [30], and “The bourgeoisie National Congress, its Leftist leaders (Nehru and [Subhas] Bose) and Roy were subject to scathing denunciations [in June 1932]’’ p. 129 [30]. The CPI went full-throated on the slogans the Comintern handed over, `Indian Workers and Peasants Soviet Republic’ `confiscation of lands belonging to the zamindars without compensation’, `a general strike as the only effective programme of action’ pp. 141-143, [30]. In 1930 CPI stood aloof from the civil disobedience movement. We learn of their betrayal from Bose’s description: “In 1930, when India was in the throes of a revolution, a body of croakers, then regarded as ultra-leftists [CPI], stood aloof from the movement and refused to join it on the ground that Congressmen were counter-revolutionaries. To call those men and women counter-revolutionaries who were defying alien ‘law and order’, braving the rigours of prison life and facing the baton-charges of the police was a bit too much for even the gullible Indian. The movement grew from strength to strength and inspired the teeming millions of this country and the ultra-leftists were left high and dry and completely isolated from the revolutionary masses’’ pp. 92-93, [2].
The India-experts of CPGB, like Dutt, paid lip-service to the Comintern line, and remained lukewarm to it. The independence of the CPGB of the Comintern, in substance, if not in form, becomes clear from John Callaghan’s analysis: “Members of the Party such as Shapurji Saklatavala, Rajani and Clemens Dutt, and Robin Page Arnott developed an expertise in relation to Indian Affairs that was all too rare within the Comintern, and naturally had their own ideas on how the cause could be best advanced on the subcontinent. The rules of democratic centralism required Communists to publicly support any Comintern Line once it was adopted, but the CPGB developed an independent viewpoint on the nationalist struggle in India which favored work within the Indian National Congress and generally eschewed the ultra-leftist analyses adopted by the International in 1928-35 and 1947-50. When the CPGB’s own position was rejected – as at the sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 – the party’s experts on India paid lip-service to the new confrontationist course but demonstrated none of the enthusiasm so evident in other periods.’’ [22].
But, that CPGB continued to control CPI becomes evident from the tone of a telegram it sent to all India Workers’ and Peasants’ Party Conference and Muzaffar Ahmad on 21.12.28, ” Hope you stand firm for independence with deeds and not empty words, as the only road to freedom from imperialist oppression. Simultaneous support of Dominion Status and independence is equivalent to the abandonment of the latter. Hope Congress will repudiate Nehru’s report as surrender and betrayal of mass interest by private property pledges’’ p. 368, [11].
In 1929 British Government of India arrested 33 individuals in India for trade union activities, and tried them in the Meerut Conspiracy trial. Two of them were from the CPGB, namely, Philip Spratt, Benjamin Francis Bradley, and another was from British Labor Party, Hugh Lester Hutchinson [32]. H. S. Surjeet mentions the first two as the CPGB members who had come to India to help [25].
Purabi Roy et al notes that in fact the CPGB’s control over the CPI intensified after the sixth Comintern Congress in which its line was rejected. “With the exit of M. N. Roy and the shift in the Comintern strategy after the Sixth Congress it was no longer any Indian (despite the presence of Abani Mukherjee, G. A. K. Luhani and Virendranath Chattopadhyaya in the Soviet Union and their willingness to work for India in Comintern) but the CPGB which became virtually the spokesman of India. This, in turn, led to an intensified control of CPGB over the CPI…CPGB leaders and emissaries like R. P. Dutt, Ben Bradley, D. Campbell, Philip Spratt and others, through their reports, interventions and vibrate with the CPI in India at various levels acted as the voice of India in Comintern and vice Versa. It is thus significant to note that at Comintern’s Seventh Congress in 1935 the main report on India was presented by Ben Bradley, under the pseudonym Tambe, who, incidentally, was officially in charge of Indian affairs in Comintern from the early 30s till the dissolution of Comintern in 1943’’ .pp. xxxii- xxxiii, [10]. Also, “Virendranath Chattopadhyaya fervently appeals to Dimitrov in 1935 for allowing him to take up responsibilities concerning India in Comintern……since the 30s the briefing on India in Comintern is being done invariably by CPGB representatives/emissaries, who constituted the contacts between Comintern and the CPI. …..Against this background, the evidence that the CPGB’s perception of India was not necessarily satisfying to many Indian Communists becomes especially significant’’ p. xxxvii, [10].
The seventh Comintern Congress held in August 1935 in Moscow placed CPI under the CPGB and reverted to the recommendations of the CPGB of forming an anti-imperialist front with the Indian National Congress. Dutt spoke in this Congress. Quoting Bipan Chandra, “By now [1935], the Comintern had once again changed its political line for the European as also colonial and semi-colonial countries. The Communist Parties were now urged to form a united front with other nationalist and anti-fascist forces. In India’s case, this line was reflected in the Dutt-Bradley Thesis of 1935.’’ [13], and “the Comintern put it [CPI] under the ‘guidance’ or hegemony of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), which made Ben Bradley, stationed in Britain as the guide and mentor of the CPI.’’ [13]. The Comintern’s order was executed in both letter and spirit. On 29 May, 1939, the British Intelligence Bureau in India had noted (in a report they shared with then home minister in the Bombay Government K. M. Munshi) that “After the VII World Congress, under instructions from the centre, the Communist Party gave up its sectarian and isolationist tactics and adopted the policy of entering all existing organizations. Pursuant to these instructions the party liquidated all sectarian organizations and joined the existing organizations like the Congress, CSP, the Trade Union and the Kisan organization, the Youth and Student organizations’’ p. 1617, [18].
Recall that Carley has clearly documented that the Comintern went over to the capitalist West calling for a ‘united front’ strategy against fascism as a result of the negotiations between Soviet Russia and Great Britain (Section A). Even Druhe notes that the acceptance of the CPGB line appears to be a consequence of the Soviet foreign policy becoming more favorable towards UK in the year 1935: “India and other colonial countries were included in the scope of the old Soviet change in policy. Its application to India was clearly evidenced in the Seventh Congress of the Communist International which took place in Moscow from July 25 to August 20, 1935. Enunciating the line which the Indian comrades must follow in the future was Wang Ming, a delegate of the Chinese Communists….. In the first place it indicated that there was no Indian Communist importance in the eyes of Moscow (as compared to MN Roy, when he was a loyal adherent of the Comintern) to lay down the correct party line for the Indian comrades.’’ pp. 141-143 [30].
This suggests some incestuous relation between the British State and the CPGB. Communist organizations in the West have been known to have traded off movements in colonized countries for securing even minor benefits for their organizations from the governments in their home bases. The British Government never persecuted its homegrown communists like the CPGB, unlike the US Government did to its Communists. In fact, some of the leading members of the CPGB, such as J. R. Campbell and Harry Pollitt, were inherently more loyal to Britain than to Comintern or Soviet Russia. J. R. Campbell was a founder member of the CPGB, and frequently served on its Central Committee starting with its reorganisation in August 1923. In 1924, he became an acting editor of the CPGB’s Workers’ Weekly newspaper. During the 1930s, along with Harry Pollitt and Willie Gallacher, he was one of the public figures most closely identified with the CPGB in public perception. In 1932, he became the Foreign Editor of the CPGB’s Daily Worker newspaper, then later in the 1930s he became its Assistant Editor, and in 1939 served briefly as its editor. Harry Pollitt had joined the CPGB from its start as well, and he served as its General Secretary from 1929-1956, with a brief hiatus during the early years of the second world war. On 3 September 1939, when Britain declared war against Nazi Germany, both Pollitt and Campbell sought to portray the conflict against Germany as anti-fascist fight. They even opposed the Comintern line that the conflict was an “Imperialist War” between two similarly culpable capitalist nations. Subsequently, Campbell was sacked as Daily Worker editor, and Pollitt was removed from his position as general secretary of the CPGB. Their statures were restored in CPGB after Hitler invaded USSR in June 1941 [24] [34].
Curiously enough no European nation with colony persecuted its own Communists, but the nations without colonies did so. One wonders if the nations with colonies perceived their local Communists to be useful in subverting the independence movements in the Colonies. In 1927 the Congress of the depressed nations, organized behind the screens by European Communists like Dutt [22], was held in Brussels. As has been recorded, “Brussels could be selected as a venue only because the socialist foreign minister, Emile Vandervelde, gave the green signal on the condition that the Belgian Congo would not be touched upon in the deliberations. The Belgian government offered the medieval Palais d’Egmont in Brussles for the purpose.’’ p. 249, [37].
The CPGB’s absolute control over the CPI since 1935, and how poorly the CPGB rated the CPI becomes evident from Bipan Chandra’s description:“the CPI was asked to implement the [Rajani Palme] Dutt-[Ben] Bradley thesis on India, which was drafted in Britain without any consultation with the leaders of the CPI. Even Jawaharlal Nehru was consulted in Switzerland in this regard by R. Palme Dutt but not the CPI at all.’’ [13]. P. C. Joshi became the general secretary of the CPI in 1935, but he was not at liberty to independently think and formulate an independent programme for CPI, his role was to merely execute the CPGB line. Bipan Chandra notes that “P.C. Joshi was chosen at the very young age of 28 as the General Secretary of the Party because older leaders were constantly bickering. And, in any case, he or his fellow Political Bureau members, equally young, were not to lead the Party in developing its programme and policies on the basis of the 7th Comintern resolutions, but only to execute or implement the Comintern policy as interpreted by the CPGB.’’ [13] Joshi would not find implementing the CPGB dictum unpalatable either, as he was deeply influenced by its ideologue, Dutt: “P.C. Joshi and other Indian Communist leaders relied heavily throughout the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s on R. Palme Dutt for a theoretical understanding of India and the Indian revolution. ‘’ [13]. One wonders if Joshi was promoted to such a senior position, at such a young age, as he was committed to the Dutt-Bradley line anyway.
On 22.12.38, J. R. Campbell (pseudonym of George Allison of the CPGB p. 238, [11]), wrote in his confidential report to Comintern on the situation in India that the British Comrades are constantly advising the CPI p. 289, [10].
The CPGB had in fact the power of life and death over the CPI. For example, the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) was formed by Jaiprakash Narayan and Minoo Masani in 1934. In the summer of 1935, the summer of the Comintern Congress, the CSP sent Masani as an emissary to the Comintern. In September, 1935, Masani got in touch with the leaders of the CPGB and the mentors of the Indian Communist party, Messrs. Harry Pollitt, R Palme-Dutt and Ben Bradley. As Druhe writes, “these gentlemen admitted to Masani that the CPI had erred in its `left sectarianism’ policy and held that now the Indian Communists should participate in a `broad anti-imperialist front’ which would operate both within and without the National Congress. Masani then asked, why should not the CPI be dissolved altogether and the socialist field be left exclusively to the CSP? Very well, answered the British Communists, if the CSP would accept affiliation with the Comintern, and in effect become the CPI, they would agree to this. On Masani’s insistence that the CSP must maintain its independence, the British Communists indicated that the Comintern must have its own party in India.’’ pp. 150-151 [30]. Subsequently, Dutt smoothed the way for collaboration between the CPI and the CSP [22]. So CPGB could dissolve the CPI, merge or ally it with any other party as it deemed fit. In other words, the CPI was a tool of the CPGB.
On 15 February 1939, a British Indian Home Department note on the Communist activity in India notes that “The CPI is ‘a section of the Communist International’, and owes full allegiance to Moscow through the British Communist Party which acts as Moscow’s intermediary for India. The Central Committee’s first duty is to obey instructions received from abroad’’ p. 1511, [21]. Thus, in effect, the CPI central committee’s first duty was to obey the CPGB’s instructions.
The same note describes how the CPI had been following the strategies adopted by CPGB in political struggles in Britain: “One section was in favour of attacking the existing Congress leadership, hoping thereby to win the support of the rank and file; another proposed that Congress should be converted to the communist view-point, thus bringing over all Congress supporters with them. A middle course has been decided upon since September last openly supporting the left-wing of Congress, with a view to its capture through the familiar communist tactics of infiltration, while strenuously opposing any ‘reactionary’ tendencies on the part of the right wing. These tactics follow the (unsuccessful) attempts of British Communists to combine with the Labour Party in forming a ‘popular front’ for the defeat of the Chamberlain government. The Congress Socialist Party has warned its members against this Communist camouflage and tightened up its own rules of membership in defence. Nevertheless the Socialist groups in Andhra, Tamil Nad, Orissa, etc. are in fact, nothing but CPI units in disguise, and considerable success can be claimed by the CPI elsewhere ‘’ pp. 1508-1509, [21]. On 29 May, 1939, the British Intelligence Bureau in India had noted (in a report they shared with K. M. Munshi) that “The instructions to the CPI come through the GB, Communist Party (Great Britain)’’ p. 1617, [18].A secret document of British intelligence dated 17.11.1939, recording events until 31.10.1939, noted that “ The Communist Party of Great Britain fulfils ‘agency’ functions on behalf of the Comintern in regard to India and is thus in a position to tender such advice to the latter as may from time to time seem necessary.’’p. 1726, [27]. This document again describes how CPI followed the CPGB’s outlook in its entirety: “This excerpt illustrates the outlook of the British Communists as it was prior to the invasion of Poland by the Soviet armies; with the collapse of Poland and the initiation of the Hitler-Stalin ‘peace’ manoeuvres, their outlook underwent a radical change: ‘the workers have no interest in this unjust war. This war is a fight between Imperialist powers for profits, colonies, and world domination’. This change of front is found reflected in latest Indian Communist propaganda; the target is throughout ‘British Imperialism’, with explanatory references to ‘the war on two fronts; the struggle against Hitler and the fight for world freedom’. In a widely distributed leaflet entitled ‘The Second Imperialist War’, written by G.M. Adhikari (one of the foremost Communists in India) and printed in Madras, British policy is distorted in the approved Soviet style, and it is stated that only with the replacement of the present form of government in Britain and France by genuine ‘anti-fascist popular governments’ will it be possible, with the help of the Soviet Union to convert the present imperialist war into a real democratic war against German fascism. This leaflet has been sent to all provincial centers as an examples for local productions—and has been adopted in the Punjab ‘Ailan-i-Jang’ referred to above in paragraph 9’’ p. 1727, [27].
A British Indian home department note on Communist activity in India had noted on 15 February, 1939, that an Indian students’ secret Communist group in England, acting under the directions of British Communist leaders have been recently regularly funding the CPI: “We have Indian Communists, who have for several years now received little financial aid from abroad, have of late once more received a certain amount of regular financial assistance from outside India. This new source of strength, although it does not compare with the early palmy days, is largely due to an Indian students’ secret Communist group in England, acting under the directions of British Communist leaders. This group, originally formed by the late S. Saklatvala and which supplied most of the present leaders of the Communist movement, has latterly been revived with the object of promoting left-wing Communism in India, through the student movement and intelligentsia. Its activities are shown to be closely related to the affairs of the India League, the London Majlis and the Federation of Indian Students Societies, and certain of its members are known to have visited Paris during the recent Communist demonstrations against the French Government ‘to study the technique of the general strike’. From these same sources, a regular sum has been contributed towards the expenses of the ‘National Front’ newspaper and the financing of other Communist ‘legal’ propaganda intended for India’s conversion to Communism ‘’ p. 1511, [21]. On 29 May, 1939, the British Intelligence Bureau in India had noted (in a report they shared with then home minister in the Bombay Government K. M. Munshi) that “ Recently £ 50 a month is being contributed from England towards the expenses of the National Front, the organ of the Communist Party. Moneys have also been received in connection with the Kanpur strike. …. The instructions to the CPI come through the GB, Communist Party (Great Britain). In the latter part of 1938 about Rs 20,000 were received in Bombay’’ p. 1617, [18] (we had reproduced part of this note earlier in this Section).
Incidentally, CPI had no direct contact with Moscow during the second world war, but only with CPGB, in particular with its leaders like Harry Pollit and Rajani Palme Dutt [36]. Bipan Chandra has noted that in 1951 Stalin had criticized CPI’s opposition to the Quit India movement [13]. In a meeting on 16.8.1947 between S. A. Dange, A. A. Zhdanov (member of the Politbureau, CPSU), M. A. Suslov (member of the Central Committee of the CPSU) in 1947, Dange had noted the “English’’ party’s advice during 1943 (on the partition question), and “ I am very glad that after long years, at last, we have succeeded in passing on information directly to the CC VKP (b) and express our apprehensions’’. pp. 356-357, 423, [10].
The irony in all this was that the anti-imperialist line of CPI, which in the India of the 1920s and the 1930s ought to mean its opposition to the British, would be determined by British nationals in the form of the CPGB. Among the leaders of the CPGB, Rajani Palme-Dutt was half Indian and half Swedish, but he was British for all practical purposes, the rest were fully English, racially as well as nationality-wise. Note that Lenin had considered M. N. Roy to be a close Comrade. Evidently neither he nor Trotsky suffered from racist prejudices. But the Comintern during Stalin’s regime (starting 1925, right after Lenin’s death), handed CPI over to CPGB, and not to M. N. Roy who was powerful within the Comintern, It appears that the Soviet regime under Stalin had reverted to the earlier Caucasian racist biases. Obviously the Soviets who dominated the Comintern had missed the racist element of the subjugation of the Indians by the British, and had considered their colonial rules within the general framework of the Communist theory of oppressor-oppressed relations transcending races.
Section C: How Imperialist Great Britain furthered the growth of the “Anti-Imperialist’’ Communist Party of India in the 1930s
We observe an interesting synergy between the treatment of the CPI by the British Government of India, the control of CPGB on CPI, and the relation between the Soviet Russia and Great Britain. In Section A we pointed out that the relation between Britain and Russia remained frosty until 1929. In Section B we pointed out that the CPGB’s line for the CPI, that CPI members ought to join Congress and cooperate with it, while criticizing its compromises, was rejected in the sixth Comintern Congress of 1928. In Section B, we also pointed out that the British Government of India had arrested 28 Indian Communists and two members of the CPGB and one member of the British Labor Party, leading to the Meerut Conspiracy Trial starting in 1929.
In this Section we first argue that those tried in the Meerut Conspiracy Case were all arrested for Trade Union activities in India, rather than for fighting for India’s freedom. We next show that the British Government of India unexpectedly released the Meerut convicts by the end of 1933, after the Meerut Sessions Court awarded them disproportionately heavy sentences in early 1933 (C.1). We also show that from mid-1933 the British Government in India facilitated the indoctrination of the bulk of the revolutionary freedom fighters detained in various jails in mainland India and at the Cellular to Communism (Section C.3). Now, recall that the relations between the USSR and Britain showed a marked improvement in 1933-34, due to fear of Hitler (Section A). Also, recall that the seventh Comintern Congress held in August 1935 in Moscow placed CPI under the CPGB and reverted to the recommendations of the CPGB of forming an anti-imperialist front with the Indian National Congress, which appears to be a consequence of the Soviet foreign policy becoming more favorable towards UK in the year 1935 (Section B). The release of the Meerut convicts and the indoctrination of the revolutionaries joining CPI both coincided with these two developments. The latter enhanced the legitimacy of the CPI among Hindu radicals who could have contributed to the revolutionary freedom fight, and effectively ended that component of the resistance from within India by the mid 1930s.
The British Government in India however did not fully trust the CPI due to its allegiance to Soviet Russia and therefore only allowed its controled growth. Towards that end, they banned the CPI, to stop it from becoming a mass movement. But, it arrested and prosecuted very few Communists throughout the 1930s, allowed their propaganda, their political activities, recruitments and influence building within various political blocs and semi-political organizations (Section C.2). This is in sharp contrast to how they crushed the revolutionary freedom fight organizations. It is also worth noting that the British Government in India perceived the CPI leadership as harmless from the point of view of their imperialist goals – otherwise they would not have released them en masse after the Meerut Conspiracy Case convictions (we point this out in Section C.1). This is also why Imperialism connived with Communism and its growth in India during this period.
Section C.1: The Release of the convicts of the Meerut Conspiracy Trial
The British Government of India had arrested 28 Indian Communists and two members of the CPGB and one member of the British Labor Party, leading to the Meerut Conspiracy Trial starting in 1929. That the concerned individuals were arrested only for trade union activities, and not for participating in freedom fight becomes apparent from the following comment of Harold Laski (chairman of the British Labor Party and a professor at the London School of Economics) in the preface he wrote for the book by Lester Huchinson, who was convicted in the Meerut Conspiracy Trial: “Men were torn from civil life for long years whose only crime was to carry out the ordinary work of trade union and political agitation after the fashion of every· day life in this country’’ p. 7, [32]. Hutchinson himself has written that: “ it was realized [by the Government of India] that the extremely heavy sentences passed by Mr. Yorke [Judge of Meerut Sessions Court] on persons who had only been engaged in ordinary trade-union and political activities’’, and “when on British territory thirty-one trade unionists had been kept in jail for four years on trial’’ pp. 179-180, [32]. All 33 individuals were tried for 4 years and the Meerut Sessions Court awarded them heavy sentences in early 1933. Hutchinson has described the sentences to be disproportionately harsh compared to the activities the trade unionists undertook: “The heavy sentences passed by Mr. Yorke had raised a storm of protest not only in India but in England. With the passing of the months, the storm had increased in intensity rather than abated. The India Office was inundated with resolutions of indignant protest sent from organizations all over the country; the Secretary of State was bombarded with questions in the House of Commons; my mother increased her campaign for our release, touring the country and compelling prominent personages to leave their arm-chairs and register their protests; and statesmen in foreign countries made sarcastic comments on British justice in theory and in practice. All this agitation necessarily made a deep impression on the Government of India; it was realized that the extremely heavy sentences passed by M.r. Yorke on persons who had only been engaged in ordinary trade-union and political activities, had defeated the Government’s object in initiating the trial; the Government of India by these sentences had forfeited every vestige of public support so necessary to successful persecution. International interest in the trial had been aroused, and the much-vaunted traditions of British justice were shown to be hollow, and public opinion was alarmed. It was quite useless for British politicians to castigate the judicial methods pursued in foreign countries, when on British territory thirty-one trade unionists had been kept in jail for four years on trial and then sentenced to long terms of transportation and rigorous imprisonment. Foreigners merely shrugged their shoulders at this further example of British cant and hypocrisy.’’ pp. 179-180, [32].
The High Court was however remarkably lenient in adjudicating on the appeals by the convicts of the Meerut Conspiracy Trial. Hutchinson writes:
- `At the beginning of April [1931] the High Court announced that it would commence to hear the Appeal in the last week of July. At the same time it heard the arguments of those who had applied for bail, releasing some and rejecting the applications of others. To everybody’s amazement, my name was included among those released although I had not even applied. The High Court justified its action by pointing out that although I had not applied for bail there was nothing to prevent me doing so in the future, and to prevent me doing this and to save further trouble they had decided to release me pending the Appeal there and then, particularly as they had released other accused with higher sentences.” p. 177, [32].
- “The Appeal was heard by two judges: the Chief Justice, Sir Shah Mohammed Sulaiman, and Mr. Justice Young. . . . It was expected that the hearing of the Appeal would take at least two months. It took exactly ten days.” p. 179, [32].
- The work of rehabilitation was done very well. The ponderous judgment of Mr. Yorke, which had taken that gentleman five months to write, was almost ignored; Mr. Kemp, who had prepared to overwhelm the Court with at least a month’s oratory, was cut short and told to confine himself to the immediate issues; Dr. Katju had only to reply to the questions put to him by the Bench; and Mr. Justice Young enlivened the proceedings with humorous interjections and sarcastic comments. After a few days of these proceedings it became apparent even to the most sceptical that the hearing of the Appeal would soon be over and the judgment delivered.” p. 180, [32].
- “There was a large crowd assembled to hear the judgment. ·I was present after having packed my belongings expecting to return to jail in the evening. The two judges came in both looking as solemn as if they were about to sentence us to death. But as the Chief Justice read the judgment, the general feeling of depression was changed to one of utter astonishment. All the sentences had been sensationally reduced. The sentence of transportation for life was reduced to three years; those who had been sentenced to twelve years· with the exception of two who had previously been convicted on the same charge had
their sentences reduced to two years, the two exceptions having each three years; those who had been sentenced to ten years had their sentences reduced to one; and all the rest including myself were either acquitted or released on the imprisonment they had already undergone.” p. 181, [32].
All the Meerut Conspiracy Case convicts were released by the end of 1933, coinciding with the improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations during this period (introduction of Section C).
The release of the Meerut Conspiracy Case convicts reveal that Britain did not assess that they posed any threats to British government in India. To see this, notice that during the same period the British hanged, deported, jailed up to 17-18 years, the revolutionaries who had the audacity to strike at the Raj. The British Government of Bengal promulgated ordinances that empowered it to indefinitely jail or detain in prison camps or other locations of their choice, without trial, any individual they even suspected of involvement in armed freedom fight. Subhas Chandra Bose has documented that “The political prisoners in Bengal numbered several thousands, the majority of whom had been imprisoned or interned without any trial whatsoever. There were also a few hundred political prisoners in the Andaman Islands-the penal settlement in the Bay of Bengal [in 1937], who had been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment and they were mostly from Bengal, Punjab and the United Provinces’’ pp. 367-368, [6]. Subhas Chandra Bose was himself jailed under these ordinances, without trial, for several years. Between 1921 and 1940, the period in which he was active in India, he was outside jail for only about 9 years, and he was released in almost every instance because his health broke down and the British did not want to risk the death of a leader of his stature in their jail. During the second world war the most dreaded revolutionaries (eg, Chattogram revolutionaries like Ganesh Ghosh, Ananta Singh, Haripada Bhattacharya, Kalipada Chakraborti and several others) were detained for several years even after they declared their support for the British war effort; many of them spent 16 years in jail altogether. Even Communists who took stringent anti-British lines at some point were detained in jail during the second world war , even after they changed their line to support the British war efforts. Indian Communist K. Damodaran has written in his memoirs:
- “The initial response of our party was to oppose the war [Second World War] and even before 1939 we were pressuring the Congress to step up the struggle against British imperialism. It was the Congress which hesitated immediately the war began. I remember at the Poona session of the All India Congress Committee in 1940, I moved an amendment to the main resolution moved by Gandhi, and was supported, incidentally, by Jawaharlal Nehru. Opposing Gandhi’s line I called for the start of a new mass struggle against the British. This was the line of the CPI at that stage. Soon after that I was arrested and remained in prison till the end of the war. It is necessary to explain why I was kept in prison when most other communists were released to implement the ‘Peoples’ War’ policy. Immediately on the outbreak of war, and in the year that followed, communists had been arrested in large numbers. In prison controversies started on whether or not our line was correct. Then the Soviet Union was invaded by the Nazi armies. Our controversies became ever more heated. Professor K. B. Krishna who was with us in jail wrote a set of theses developing the ‘Peoples’ War’ line and advocating that now everything had changed and that communists should drop their anti-imperialist activities and their opposition to war. I wrote a set of counter-theses arguing that while the existence of the Soviet Union was vital, nonetheless the best way to help the Russian comrades was not by ceasing all anti-imperialist activity, but on the contrary by stepping it up. Our enemy remained British imperialism. The majority of communists inside prison supported my line and only a tiny minority was in favour of the ‘Peoples’ War’ theses. Then some months later we heard that the British party had changed its line and that Moscow was in favour of the change. Outside the jail, the party secretary P. C. Joshi, who was initially one of the strongest opponents of the ‘Peoples’ War’ line, had to change his line and start using his oratorical skills to convince party members, and also the masses, of the importance of helping the war effort. After the change of line most of the pro-war communists were released, but some, including myself, were kept in prison. British intelligence knew perfectly well who to release and who to keep inside.’’ [19].
- “For instance, even on the war issue, when a circular from the party leadership arrived to our party Jail Committee instructing us to carry out the pro-war line I automatically dropped my positions and was mocked by the others who said ‘You considered yourself one of the party theoreticians, but you were wrong!’ This incident typifies how we were trained as communists. I made a self-criticism and admitted I was wrong. I had to do so because the party was always right, but doubts persisted and in later years I was reassured that I had been correct. …However, in spite of the self-criticism the British did not release me from prison. It is possible that their intelligence services decided that my self-criticism was far too shallow. The official charge-sheet handed to me in prison gave as one reason for my continued detention the fact that I had opposed the line of the ‘People’s War’. This was written black on white on my charge sheet! Of course the CP leadership made numerous representations to the British authorities demanding our release, but to no avail. I was not released till October 1945’’ [19].
The Meerut conspiracy case convicts like Muzaffar Ahmad, S.A. Dange, S.V. Ghate , K.N. Joglekar, R.S. Nimbkar, S. S. Mirajkar, Shaukat Usmani, Mir Abdul Majid, Sohan Singh Josh, Ajodhya Prasad, G. Adhikari, P.C . Joshi, Shamsul Huda, D. R Thengdi [26], [33] formed the nucleus of the CPI leadership. P. C. Joshi became the general secretary of the CPI in 1935 at the age of 28 [13], and held his position until 1947, the year the British left. Thus, during the freedom fight, the CPI was led by personnel who were trusted by the British to do no harm to their empire in India.
British intelligence reports reveal that the Meerut conspiracy case had not impeded the growth of Communism in India in any way. On 29 May, 1939, the British Intelligence Bureau in India had noted (in a report they shared with then home minister of the Bombay Government, K. M. Munshi) “Subsequent events showed that the Meerut Case had not caused more than a temporary setback to Communist plans in India. Evidence accumulated to show that the Communist Party had been reformed on a new and more ambitious scale and that attempts were again being made by Communists in various parts of India to secure control over workers’ organizations, and to organize a combined workers’ and peasants’ revolutionary movement under Communist leadership’’ p. 1615, [18]. In fact, H. S. Surjeet has written that the trial and the subsequent release were instrumental in the growth of the CPI: “However, a Party with a centralised apparatus, came into being only after the release of the Meerut prisoners, in 1933. The Meerut Conspiracy Case, though launched to suppress the communist movement, provided the opportunity for Communists to propagate their ideas. It came out with its own manifesto and was affiliated to the Communist International in 1934’’ [25]. So the CPI formally joined the Comintern in 1934.
Section C.2: A regulated growth of the CPI under the watchful eyes of the British Government in India
Britain still did not trust the CPI fully owing to the CPI’s allegiance to Russia. Britain wanted to further the growth of CPI in only a controlled manner to utilize it for its own purpose, for example, to serve as a fifth column in the freedom movement, particularly of the armed variety. But, it did not want the CPI to grow into a mass organization. Britain therefore officially banned the CPI in 1934 so as to have an instrument readily available for utilization should the need to crush it arise in for example the eventuality that the relations with Russia worsen again. The ban would also come handy to selectively remove exactly those leaders and workers who do not toe a line conducive to the British interests. In this context, recall K. Damodaran’s description as to how the British Government in India selectively retained in jail those Communists it assessed to have not sincerely allied with British interests in India.
The British intelligence report shared with Munshi on 29 May, 1939, states the following about the ban on CPI: “In 1934 the Communist Party of India, its committees, sub-committees and branches were declared unlawful associations under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908, on the ground that they constituted a danger to the public peace’’ p. 1615, [18]. The report further states: “Govt recognized that apart from its psychological effect, the ban would act as a deterrent in obstructing and impeding Communist activity in India, forcing it underground and thereby prevent it from developing into the open mass revolutionary movement which Communism in its later stages aims to achieve. It was in fact not so much the immediate activities of the Communists as their ultimate object, which led to the Communist Party being declared unlawful… The ban has achieved its purpose of preventing communism in India from spreading into an organized mass movement, without having recourse to frequent and protracted criminal proceedings ‘’ p. 1616, [18]. Note that the “immediate activities’’ of the CPI were not deemed dangerous by the British Government when CPI was banned. The ban was lifted only in 1942 when CPI openly allied with Britain in its war against the Axis powers.
Despite the ban, however, the British Government in India never sought to hound the Communists (unlike what they did to the Indian revolutionary freedom fighters). Very few leaders and cadres were arrested until end of 1939. On 15 February, 1939, a British India Home Department note on Communist activity in India had stated that “The Communist Party in India has been declared an illegal organization. Consequently its ‘open’ activities are restricted and necessarily disguised. Any compromising ‘party work’ liable to come within the scope of Criminal Law Amendment Act are being conducted by a secret ‘inner organization. A belief in communism, or a mere statement of revolutionary policy, is no offence. Hence prosecutions of Communists are few and far between’’ p. 1510, [21]. Bipan Chandra mentions for example that CPI General Secretary P. C. Joshi was arrested in 1935 but “released after a few weeks because of good work as a gardener in the jail garden.’’ [13]. Recall the contrast with the treatment meted to even those the British Government of India even suspected of participating in revolutionary freedom fight. Thus, the Communists were largely not perceived by the British as even minor threats to their state machinations.
In fact, Joshi and all other top leaders of the CPI pursued their political activities freely throughout this period (Section D). Joshi travelled extensively and built CPI. Bipan Chandra notes “In 1936-37 Joshi toured all provinces and from the scratch formed Provincial Party Committees. He successfully continued to build the Party during 1938-41’’ [13]. The British India Home Department note on 15 February, 1939 writes about some of Joshi’s travels and political activities: “Reached Calcutta 27/11/38 to study labour situation and unite the rival Communist groups pp. 1512-1513. Visited mill area and Coolies’ Union office: participated in ‘National Front demonstration’ 30/11/38: Attended Tramway Workers’ meeting in Calcutta 1/12/38 and Bengal Kisans Conference 2/12/38. On 6/12/38 attended secret discussion to achieve a merger between Socialist and Communist groups. At a public meeting the same day emphasized concerted action by all radical elements in and outside the Congress in accordance with the ‘Call to Congress’ (Left Bloc). Attended two secret meetings of Students on 7/12/38. On 8/12/38 at a public meeting of 1000 youths advocated the overthrow of British Imperialism through an agrarian revolution as the first step towards the establishment of a Socialist State. On 13/12/38 appealed for subscribers to the various Communist organs e.g. The National Front, New Age, Ganasakti. Under instructions from Bombay, left for Cuttack 14/12/38. Proceeded to Dhenkanal on 16/12/38 and moved in the interior as a press reporter. Returned to Calcutta on 18/12/38 and advised the dispatch of ‘Comrades’ to participate in the Dhenkanal Agitation. Sent messages to Nabakrishna Choudhry, Orissa MLA, offering the services of Oriya dockers and Bengal Jute workers as Satyagrahis in Orissa State agitation. Sent highly coloured articles with photographs of ‘atrocities’ to National Front for publication. Instructed Bengal Communists to answer a CPI questionnaire (vide paragraph 9) regarding the comparative strengths of the Left and Right Wings ‘’ p. 1513, [21].
The British India Home Department note on 15 February, 1939 states that CPI was able to expand within several other organizations during this period, and gained “numerous sympathizers’’ and “active followers’’: “ It is unnecessary to emphasize the communistic tendencies in left-wing agitation, and it is safer to regard Kisan Sabhas, trade unions, youth leagues and the socialist movement in general as the active followers, in some cases unknowingly but in others in less blissful ignorance, of the Communist revolutionary path. The term ‘Communist’ is to be interpreted as meaning not only actual membership of the CPI which, partly owing to its illegal status, is necessarily restricted, but also its numerous sympathizers and extensive following throughout the peasant’s and workers’ movements ‘’ p. 1509, [21].
The report does not give an actual membership number, but states that it continued to develop sub-committees in various provinces, and established a `legal’ organ known as the National Front, all obviously with full awareness of the British state: “Actual membership figures are not stated; these would in any case be misleading. The Central Committee functions from Bombay, which is the headquarters, through the office of the ‘National Front’ which is the Party’s ‘legal’ organ. Provincial and other sub¬ committees exist in the Punjab, UP and Bengal—also in Madras, Orissa, Sind and Bihar. The last three are recent developments and more or less in embryo, so that the main Communism centers in India are—as they have been since the early twenties when Communist first came to India— Bombay, Punjab, UP, Bengal and Madras’’ p. 1511, [21]. Note that the National Front was started in February, 1938, and P. C. Joshi served as its editor [13]. A secret document authored by high levels of British intelligence on recent developments in Communism in India till 31-10-1939, submitted on 17.11.1939, estimates the membership as a few hundred p. 1722, [27], but this is probably an underestimate. K. Damodaran who was in CPI during this period had written in his memoirs that “The membership of the Party increased from about 150 in 1934 to more than 3,000 in 1939.’’ [19]
The number of members and sympathizers of the CPI rose as the British Government in India allowed them to conduct their propaganda. The British India Home Department note on 15 February, 1939 lists the CPI unofficial mouthpieces at that point: “Examples of this type of propaganda, deriving inspiration very largely from foreign publications, are the National Front (English), Karanti (Marathi) in Bombay; Sathi (Hindi), Ganasakti (Bengali), Comrade (English) of Bengal; New Age (English), Nava Sakti (Te\egu),Jana Sakti (Tamil) of Madras;/cznflta (Hindi) of Bihar; Krishak (Oriya) of Orissa; Azad (Sindhi) of Sind; and the Kirti Lehr (Gurmukhi, Urdu and Hindi), LaiJhanda (Urdu and Hindi), Chingari (Urdu), Inquilab (Hindi) and Naya Hindustan (Hindi) of UP. In addition, there are a string of ‘locals’ and two-anna ‘pamphlet series’ advocating Communism, produced by such firms as the Agra Socialist Publishing Co. and complete with forewords by leading Indian Communists on how best to translate theory into practice. An authority connected with the Press, and not the Police, has recently recorded the view that these are nothing but ‘group organs’ and that they—rather than bigger newspapers dealing with news as such—-are influencing mass opinion and deflecting it more and more to the left’’ p. 1512, [21].
The Communists were also organizing strikes, eg, the Bombay ‘protest strike’ in November, 1938, and were spreading into the princely states by 1939 p. 1512, [21].
The CPI was spreading its influence in other political blocs, the Congress Socialist Party, being a prime example. A secret document of British intelligence dated 17.11.1939, recording events until 31.10.1939 [27], noted that
- “The Communist Party in India has no more than a few hundred members. But its influence is to be measured not so much by its size as by its ability to guide other groups and organizations; it is not so much the open activities of Communists and the direct influence of the illegal Communist Party which call for serious attention as the insidious and seditious manner in which they are able to penetrate other organizations, and the indirect hold which Communist teachings exert over the national movement’’ p. 1722, [27].
- “Communist policy in India is mainly opportunist. But there is at the same time a consistent factor in the use of Congress as a cover for activities aimed at the capture of political power—first within the Congress Socialist Party and ultimately in the Congress organization as a whole ‘’ p. 1723, [27].
- “The success made by the Communists of their policy of‘infiltration’ caused the resignation of four leading Congress Socialists (Masani, Asoke Mehta, Lohia, and Achyut Patwardhan) from the Socialist Party last July, as a protest against Communist domination. In a statement issued by these socialist leaders, they stated that Communist infiltration had gone very far, and was interfering with the free initiative and development of the Indian socialist movement ‘’ p. 1723, [27].
- “The Congress Socialist Party has warned its members against this Communist camouflage and tightened up its own rules of membership in defence. Nevertheless the Socialist groups in Andhra, Tamil Nad, Orissa, etc. are in fact, nothing but CPI units in disguise, and considerable success can be claimed by the CPI elsewhere (British India Home Department note on 15 February, 1939) ‘’ pp. 1508-1509, [21].
- “The ease with which Communists have been able to penetrate labour and peasant bodies throughout the Congress organization and assume the role of ‘local leaders’ is illustrated by the recent success of the Communist minority in the Bombay Trade Union Congress in obtaining the passage of a resolution in favour of one-day protest strikes in Bombay on October 2nd [1939] against the wishes of the moderate non-Communist majority. Detailed examination of the personnel of Provincial and local Congress Committees reveals a surprisingly large number of known Communists and active sympathizers (who do not necessarily acknowledge party membership) as secretaries and office bearers. Throughout the Congress Socialist Party also, Communists are in complete control of many of the subordinate socialist groups; and Communists dominate the labour, peasants, and youth movements. The reason for the ascendancy is to be found in the comparative apathy of the non-Communists as contrasted with the zeal and better organization of the Communist workers ‘’ p. 1723, [27].
This entire expansion of the CPI in membership, sympathizers and influence building happened under the watch of British imperialism. It is therefore fair to conclude that Imperialism was colluding with Communism during the 1930s.
Section C.3: The British facilitation of the indoctrination of the freedom fighting revolutionaries into Communism
The British Government in India had been continuously detaining the Indian revolutionaries in various jails in mainland India and at Cellular starting from the turn of the twentieth century. In the 1930s it activily facilitated the recruitment of these political prisoners to the ranks of the CPI. Subodh Roy, the youngest participant in the Chittagong Armory raid (1930), at the age of 14, was one of the recruits from Cellular. He has spelt out the motive underlying the indulgence of the British Government: “The government thought that they would be able to divert the minds of political prisoners by making them interested in socialist ideas, which they thought were a lesser evil than “terrorist” actions such as the murder of oppressive British officials’’ Loc 1078-1085, [16].
The process of conversion of the revolutionaries to Communism was much like what is routinely deployed by Missionaries of various religions – Christian Missionaries, Sufis, etc. The Communists worked on a traumatized populace isolated from their natural habitat and ecosystem – revolutionaries in the prime of their youth, broken by torture in various jails and plagued by a sense of failure about attaining their end-goal of liberating India. They were led towards their new creed, gently, through a generous supply of socialist and communist literature, which perhaps constituted the only thought-provoking reading material those educated men and women were given access to. The targets of conversion were persuaded that the CPI strove towards the same goal as the one that the targets had committed their lives to – freedom of India; the CPI merely advocated a different method, that of Communist mass struggle, which was based on strong intellectual foundations and had succeeded in other countries. This reminds us of how Sufi and Christian Missionary syncretism constituted the first step in conversion to Islam and Christianity in populaces defeated by the invaders professing the same religion. As the targets veered towards Communism, their lives in prison were eased, grueling labor sessions were replaced with stimulating group discussions on Marxist analysis and with sporting events. The bulk of the targets succumbed. Enforcing the analogy with the Missionaries, the CPI leaders at the forefronts of such conversion bore strong contempt for the previous choices of their targets, which also explains why only the lower rung of the revolutionary-converts could rise up to the top of the CPI and the front-ranking revolutionaries languished at the bottom or the mid-level. As the British anticipated (refer to the motive spelt out by Subodh Roy), the revolutionaries who joined the CPI did not engage in any further acts of resistance against the British imperialism, either armed or unarmed – many of them actually sabotaged the resistance movements. The association of the revolutionary vanguard with the CPI enhanced its credibility enormously among the youth with natural propensity towards radicalism and thereby diverted precious manpower towards the CPI. Thus, the CPI was instrumental in killing the revolutionary freedom fight from within India mid 1930-onwards. They were indeed the Sufis of British Imperialism.
We start with the modality of the conversion. Purabi Roy et al have painstakingly collected documents from Russian archives, pertinent to India, between 1917-1947, which show how the British Government facilitated the indoctrination of the revolutionaries jailed at Cellular into Communism [10]. The editors of this compilation has noted, “ On the initiative of Dr. Narayan Roy and Niranjan Sen, two very prominent leaders of the prisoners [of Cellular Jail], since mid-1933 efforts began to be made to introduce Marxist ideas among the inmates and draw them away from the path of terrorism. On 26 April, 1935 a large section of the prisoners, coming mainly from Bengal, Bihar, U.P. and Punjab, secretly formed the Communist Consolidation Committee (CCC) in Andaman jail and on 1 May its formation was officially announced. The formation of the CCC was a turning point in the spread of communist ideas in the mid-30s in the sense that within the next few years prisoners in batches embraced Marxism by abandoning the path of terrorism and many of them then joined the CPI. …Between 1935 and 1938 the Andaman prisoners were released in batches and as many of them joined the banned Communist Party immediately after being freed, secret organizational contacts were now established between the CPI, those who came out and joined the Party and those who had embraced Marxism and the ideology of the CPI but had not yet been freed from detention’’ p. 421, [10]. Recall that the Anglo-Soviet relations showed a marked improvement in 1933-1934 and the Comintern formally handed the CPI over to the CPGB in 1935.
Narayan Roy and Niranjan Sen were indoctrinated into Marxism by the Congress Socialist leaders. In fact, they provided the duo the Communist literature they brought to Cellular (Note the Congress Socialist Party leadership was then based outside Bengal, in the form of Jayprakash Narayan, Bihar, Minoo Masani, Parsee, Gujarat/Bombay, Madhu Limaye, Marathi, Achyut Patwardhan, Marathi [12], Ram Manohar Lohia, North Indian). We refer to the memoirs of Subodh Roy who was sentenced to a life term at the Cellular. He was one of those indoctrinated to Communism by Roy and Sen at Cellular.
- “In 1930, the government discovered a bomb factory in Machuabazar (near Calcutta University). This case resulted in the arrest of twenty-three revolutionaries, including Niranjan Sen, Satish Pakrashi, Sudhangshu Dasgupta and Narayan Roy. Sen, Roy and Pakrashi brought the literature [mentioned below] to the Cellular Jail’’ Footnote 1 of Loc 1078, [16].
- “Dr. Narayan Roy and Niranjan Sen Gupta arrived at the Cellular Jail with a trunk load of literature on socialism, communism, and the Soviet Union. They were both from Bengal, and pioneers in preaching communist ideology among political prisoners in the Andamans. Congress Socialist leaders in Yerawada Central Jail, where these men were serving sentenced for participating in the Civil Disobedience movement, supplied them the literature. Readers would be surprised to know that we also got books on socialism at government cost. …Thus the government had some hand in making political prisoners in the Andamans interested in socialism. They had unknowingly sowed the seeds of communism among political prisoners detained in other jails as well’’ Loc 1078-1085, [16].
Thus, the British government provided socialist literature to the revolutionaries in jail, free of cost, so as to divert their minds from the greater evil of revolutionary activities. They sowed the seeds of communism among the political prisoners, knowingly, rather than what Roy believes – “unknowingly.’’ In general, the British exerted tight control on the reading material available to the revolutionaries. Revolutionary Shanti Das (nee Ghose) who had assassinated Stevens, an English District Magistrate in Kumilla on 14 December, 1931, had recalled in her memoirs how in Medinipur jail the British did not allow her to read books on sociology and anthropology that her maternal uncle, Prof. Satkari Mitra, brought for her. Prof. Mitra was a popular Congress leader in the 24 Pargana district (p. 89, [1]).
Subodh Roy’s memoirs also reveal that the conditions at Cellular became “bearable’’ around the time the revolutionaries were being indoctrinated into communism (he was tortured on capture post his participation in the Chattogram uprising):
- “Owing to the pressure on the authorities because of our increased numbers, our workload [in Cellular] became minimal. We could play outdoor games like football and we also organized sports meets. Finally, we gave up doing jail labor at all, though it was an essential part of rigorous imprisonment in jail. We devoted our time to collective reading, group discussions and outdoor games….’’Loc 1045, [16].
- “we kept ourselves busy in group activities, devoted time for both academic and political self-education, and indoor and outdoor games’’ Loc 1063, [16].
Chattogram revolutionary Kalipada Chakrabarti was part of the Chattogram revolutionaries who had fought at Jalalabad, while starving, and had forced an entire British battalion to retreat from there. He was also indoctrinated into Communism at the same time at Cellular. We learn from his memoirs that gradually he and the revolutionaries who arrived with him were relieved of all labor. They immersed themselves in their studies, which comprised of Communism then p. 151, [5].
Purabi Roy et al have reproduced one letter from the Communist Consolidation Andaman Committee to the Bengal Committee of CPI. Among other things, the letter tells us that the Communist Consolidation Andaman Committee had knowledge of the list of their recruits who would be released and the time of their release. They also wanted instructions from the CPI as to the supposed acts of resistance performed from within Cellular, namely hunger strikes. It is remarkable that the British Government was freely allowing such correspondences, which was unusual for political prisoners. We also learn that the revolutionary groups such as the Jugantar and Anushilan were fast being liquidated. The letter stated: “..Present strength of the outer organization (i.e. consolidation) is 137 (Punjab 4, Bihar U.P. 5, rest from Bengal). Very soon we expect more admission. All the terrorist groups (Jugantar and Anushilan) are being fast liquidated. From this 137, a provisional member list (for Party Committee) is drawn which is at present 39 and kept secret (Punjab 2, U.P. 5, Bihar 2, rest from Bengal). By the 7th June boat we have sent a letter to you and mentioned that 8 of our comrades are going soon…In that letter we have given detailed information of this place. There we wanted some clarification (1) regarding past or past lives contained in your letter (2) Policy of Party regarding Constituent Assembly and the coming election (3) Release or repatriation and uniform classification of all political prisoners has become an all India political issue now. In the event of non-compliance with these demands, whether it would be advisable for us to launch a political struggle in the form of hunger-strike (4) Literatures – (a) Political thises and the Organizational Scheme of the Party (b) History of the Party and other literatures (c) Report of the 7th Congress of the Comintern (d) Party leaflets, Phamplets etc. Necessary information regarding the Comrades going soon…… Members of the provisional list going within one and half year is about 10. Members of the outer organization (consolidation) going within one and half year is 20….. pp. 277-278, [10] .
The indoctrination process was not limited to Cellular, however. The editors of a compilation of documents collected from Russian archives, pertinent to India, between 1917-1947 has noted, “ In fact, inspired by the example of Andaman, CCCs [Communist Consolidation Committees] were formed in other jails and detention camps too in different parts of India which furthered this process of transformation’’ p. 421, [10]. Recall that Subodh Roy had mentioned that “ They [the British Government] had unknowingly sowed the seeds of communism among political prisoners detained in other jails as well’’ Loc 1078-1085, [16]. RSP historian Buddhadeb Bhattacharyya has also documented: “During the detention period of 1930-38 the national revolutionaries, including the Anushilanites, at last found the time for clarification of their ideas. It was during this period they ultimately realized the futility of individual terrorism and group armed action without mass involvement. They avidly read the Marxist-Leninist classics and after prolonged debates and discussions stretching over months and years in different detention camps finally veered round to Marxism-Leninism’’ p. 21, [9].
As indicated above, the conversion in other jails followed the samed modus operandi as in Cellular: revolutionaries were given access to Communist books and literature, these could have been the only reading material they had access to, and were provided opportunity for unfettered discussion of what they read. We also notice that during the early stages of the conversion, the revolutionary freedom fighters were persuaded that the Communists professed the same ideals and had dedicated them to the same cause, namely the freedom of India, but differed only in methodology. Thus the conversion was presented to them as a natural transition as opposed to fundamental transformation. These become apparent from the memoirs of Chattogram revolutionary, Kalpana Dutta (1913-1995), who had become a communist in Hijli jail in West Bengal between 1933-1939 [14] [15]. She writes how she was converted to Communism: “Immediately, upon my conviction, I was taken to Hijli special jail where there was plenty of opportunity to read among the other women detenus and prisoners of Div. II. . .. …A few periodicals and journals of a progressive type like the Parichaya began to trickle through the prison bars. From there, I could hear about Communism from time to time and from them too came to me books of Socialism and Communism by Joad, Cole and Shaw. …The arguments and the approach of these books began to stir the mind and forced me to ponder over the difference that these have with the revolutionary literature in which I had been steeped so long. The narratives of revolutionary deeds, the lives of Khudiram, Kanailal, Bhagat Singh no doubt stirred us to the very core, teaching us to defy death: but these writings on Socialism and Communism could not be set aside as irrelevant, and so the faint rumblings of a new battle could be heard within myself. These I began to read avidly, but understood in my own way, fitting them into the trend of my own thoughts: and so it seemed that Communism was alright and that there was no difference between it and our own ideas. When someone would say that the Communists looked upon the terrorists as opponents, I would laugh it off and could never believe it. If our ideals were the same and both of us had dedicated ourselves to the cause of freedom, then we were but fellow-travellers and could never be opponents. And yet I could not help confessing to myself that the Communists were more widely read and knew a lot more than us of men and things, of the world at large and of the people and their past, and so I nurtured a sneaking admission of our own inferiority’’ pp. 87-88, [14].
We give two examples of revolutionaries who were indoctrinated in jails other than Cellular, both of them subsequently rose to the topmost echelons of the CPI.
- Promode Dasgupta (1910-1992) was born in Faridupur district now in Bangladesh. He joined the revolutionary group Anushilan Samity, while he was a student in the Brajmohan College in Barisal. He was arrested in connection with the famous Machua Bazzar Bomb Case in 1929 mentioned before. There was not enough evidence to convict him though some of his co-accused were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. But he was detained for eight years in various jails in Bengal and in the Deoli detention camp under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendent Act. He was released in 1937. He joined CPI on May 1, 1938, and began working among the dock labour in Calcutta. He worked as the Secretary of the Calcutta District Committee of the Party subsequently. He was arrested during the early years of the Second World War, and was released after the legalisation of the Party in 1942. Then he organised the press of the Bengal Committee of the Party and the publication of its first Bengali Weekly Jan Yudh and later Swadhinata daily. After independence, he was elected Secretary of the West Bengal State Committee of CPI at the Burdwan State Conference prior to the Sixth Party Congress in Vijayawada in 1961. He remained in that post till his death. He was elected to the National Council of the CPI at the Fifth Amritsar Congress of the Party in 1958 and to its Central Executive Committee in 1961. When CPI split into two factions, he moved to CPIM. He was elected to the Politbureau of the CPI(M) at the Seventh Congress in 1964, a post which he held till his death [28].
- Ajoy Ghosh was born in Mihijam in Bengal on 20 February 1909. His father was a well-known physician who was settled in Kanpur. Ajoy Ghosh had his schooling in Kanpur, and subsequently studied in the University of Allahabad. He joined the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association (HSRA) and was closely associated with front-ranking revolutionaries like Bhagat Singh, Chandrashekhar Azad, etc. He was arrested in 1929 and was tried in the Second Lahore Conspiracy Case, along with Bhagat Singh. He was released due to lack ofevidence against him (though three of his co-accused were sentenced to death). In 1931, he joined the trade Union Movement in Kanpur and was arrested. After his release in 1933, he joined the CPI, became its Politbureau member in 1938. In 1951, he became the General Secretary of the CPI and remained so till his death on 11 January 1962 p. 1528, [35].
Among the revolutionaries who joined the CPI, only those who belonged to the lower ranks could rise to the highest echelons of the CPI (eg, the Politbureau). For example, both Pramod Dasgupta and Ajoy Ghosh, who reached the Politbureau, belonged to dreaded revolutionary organizations, but could not be convicted because of lack of evidence, suggesting that they were in the lower ranks of those revolutionary organizations. In contrast, the Chattogram revolutionaries who were transported to Cellular on life sentences remained at lower or mid-levels (eg, Subodh Roy, Ganesh Ghosh).
By 1939, CPI had successfully indoctrinated bulk of the youth who had joined the revolutionary movement. As reproduced in the above paragraph, P. C. Joshi wrote that in the thirties, the vast majority of the terrorist detenus and prisoners became Communists’’ pp. 3-4, [14]. He has also written that “Almost all the Chittagong Raiders, both the leaders within prison-walls and their followers who are outside are within our Party today. Our Party is thus not only the historic but the living heir of what the Chittagonians with great pride call the ‘Spirit of Surja Sen’, and the ‘Chittagong tradition’’ p. 4, [14]. On 24 January, 1939, Hindu Mahasabha leader Ashutosh Lahiry wrote to Savarkar, 24 January 1939, “As regards the youth of Bengal, I would like to inform you that most of the released detenues and political prisoners are either communists or socialists. We expect that your speech should clearly explain the dangers of communism with its materialistic philosophy based on purely economic motives of man, devoid of religion and culture. Besides any efforts to divide India on an economic basis and form political parties purely on that line would menace India’s internal solidarity. The danger of internationalism should be emphasized and efforts to weaken the force of nationalism should be deprecated. These communists and socialists are international in political outlook. It is due to the absence of nationalism that India had been enslaved to foreign nations at the various stages of her past history. India has been always cosmopolitan and she had to pay heavily for such liberal political mentality. The communists want again to bring back those days which have wrought untold sufferings to India. By actual historical instances you can reinforce this point ‘’ [29]. The conversion to Communism was so endemic that before commencing a hunger strike demanding their release, the political prisoners of Bengal issued an appeal in the CPI mouthpiece National Front for nationwide solidarity with their cause [23]. The revolutionaries joining the CPI enhanced its popularity in the radical section of the populace. Thus, CPI managed to strike a serious blow at the armed component of the freedom struggle, by weaning off those could have subscribed to that course.
H. S. Surjeet has acknowledged how Communism in India grew through influx of former revolutionaries in general: “In the development of the Communist movement in India two other factors played an important role. First, was the conversion of revolutionaries who had taken the path of terrorism, renouncing it and joining the ranks of communists. Realising that terrorist methods are not the solution, many of them influenced by communist ideas, joined the Party. These included members of the Anusheelan, Jugantar, Hindustan Socialist Republican Party of Bhagat Singh and some other groups. The Communist Party was therefore able to inherit the best revolutionary traditions of the Indian Freedom movement.’’ [25].
One also needs to notice how Surjeet refers to the armed freedom struggle with contempt – in particular the revolutionaries who joined the CPI had to be “converted’’ and “renounce’’ their “path of terrorism’’ to become Communists. In an article written in remembrance of Pramod Dasgupta, CPI mouthpiece Ganashakti had written, “Those were the days when the revolutionary youth of Bengal believed that with their individual heroism they can defeat the imperialist rulers and win the country’s freedom’’ [28], implying that the revolutionary movement was misguided. P. C. Joshi, has described the revolutionary freedom fighters as “terrorist detenues and prisoners’, had entitiled them only of “revolutionary dreams’’, “illusions’’ and had implied that they were misguided. From the Communist perspective, “terrorism was the infant’’ and “Communism was the mature stage of revolutionary lives’’. We reproduce how he describes the conversion of his wife, Chattogram revolutionary Kalpana Dutta to a Communist, in the foreword of a book she wrote: “ She describes in the most matter-of-fact manner how she got drawn towards our Party by very natural stages as she began to work. To read her own story is to understand a living phase of our national movement, how it was that, in the thirties, the vast majority of the terrorist detenus and prisoners became Communists. Their coming under the banner of the Party was for them at once an easy and a difficult step to take. It was easy because in the policy and practice of our Party, they saw the more scientific and successful struggle for their own revolutionary dreams. It was difficult because they had to live down their own illusions and see through their heads where they had gone wrong and where they had to correct themselves to be able to continue fighting the country’s battle to which they had pledged themselves in the teens. These reminiscences reveal how terrorism was the infant as Communism was the mature stage of their revolutionary lives’’, 22, October, 1946, pp. 3-4, [14]. Not surprising then that the front-ranking revolutionaries languished at most at mid-levels of the CPI.
Conclusion
In the sequel, we show that the revolutionaries who joined the CPI, surrendered to the British imperialism to the extent of sabotaging Indian resistance against British imperialism during the second world war. We conclude with the observation that not all revolutionaries detained in jails however adopted Communism. We mention a few of the eminent exceptions. Chattogram revolutionary Benod Behari Dutta was born in 1908 to Dinabandhu and Premadamayi Dutta, in Mathpara village of Potiya police station in Chattogram District. He was recruited by Kalipada Chakraborti in 1926. He had joined in the police armory raid. He became seriously injured at Machine Gun firing in Jalalabad, was taken to the safety of his elder sister’s home by his friend Kalikinkar De, under the instructions of Masterda Surjo Sen. He recovered after long treatment. On the way to Borma village in the Potiya police station he attacked with his revolver police detective Shashangka who was pursuing him. The detective was injured, but survived. In 1930 the police issued an arrest warrant in his name pertaining to the Armory Raid Trial and declared an award. But, he had evaded arrest for longest time. He was entrusted with revolutionary organization in the northern part of Chattogram District, after the battle at Jalalabad. He was entrusted with overall organization of Chattogram group after Masterda and Tarakeshwar Dastidar were jailed. He was the architect of the cricket club attack, and had absconded successfully for 11 years. He received a jail term of 7 years when he was captured eventually in 1941 pp. 387, 346, 415, [3]. Chattogram revolutionary Lokenath Bal had an immense reputation as a leader of the student and youth movements in Chattogram. He had joined the Non Cooperation Agitation in 1921 and was detained without trial 1924-28. He commanded the group that fought at Jalalabad, while starving, and had forced an entire British battalion to retreat from there. He was arrested in 1930 in Chandernagore and sentenced to life term in the Armory Raid Trial. He had clearly stated subsequently to his countrymen and Gandhi that he did not believe in terrorism any more. He had spent more than 14 years in jail and had been suffering from high blood pressure and heart disease. In 1945 he was in Dhaka Central Jail. p. 352, [3]. They did not accept Communism. Women revolutionaries like Shanti Das (nee Ghose) and Bina Das did not adopt Communism, either, despite long stints in jail. Most of the Anushilan Samiti revolutionaries had adopted Marxism-Leninism, but did not join the CPI, and later formed a party of their own, the Revolutionary Socialist Party of India (RSPI). RSP historian Buddhadeb Bhattacharyya has documented: “ Except for a section of national revolutionaries, including Anushilan men, who went over to the Communist Consolidation and later the CPI, the majority of Anushilan members, though being convinced of Marxism-Leninism, still hesitated. While they accepted Marxism in principle and held the Soviet Union in high esteem for her magnificent achievements in the field of a economic reconstruction they seriously doubted the efficacy of the Comintern as an agency for promoting world revolution and more particularly for aiding the anti-imperialist movements in colonies’’ p. 21 [9]. This group never compromised with the British imperialism.
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