(This article has been co-authored by Saswati Sarkar, Shanmukh, Dikgaj)
Section A: Introduction
On 6 June, 2026, in a speech commemorating the formation of West Bengal, Prime Minister Narendra Modi named G. D. Birla among the proponents of Bengali Hindu homeland in India. He named G. D. Birla along with Bengali stalwarts like Dr Shyamaprasad Mookerjee, Dr Meghnad Saha, Dr Ramesh Chandra Mazumdar, P. R. Thakur. Prime Minister’s public statement, particularly at an August occasion has historical significance. It is therefore important to correct the records, which is the purpose of the current article.
It is hard to think of any one individual, except among the British or Islamists, who harmed Bengalis (which is usually used to denote the Bengali Hindus historically) more than Ghanashyamdas (abbreviated as G. D.) Birla. First, he was not Bengali, but more importantly, in his own mind, he did not belong to Bengal which was but a land of exile to him and he thought poorly of Bengalis (Section A). Simultaneously, he had an inordinate influence on the unofficial contemporary leader of Congress, Mohandas Karamchand (abbreviated as M. K.) Gandhi and Gandhi’s coterie (Section B). He used his influence to help British enact policies that disempowered Bengalis and steer Congress towards letting a Muslim League Government continue in power in Bengal which discriminated against Bengalis (Section C). He also used his influence to help British crush the revolutionary freedom fighters of which an overwhelming majority were Bengalis (Section D). He orchestrated the expulsion of Subhas Chandra Bose from Congress (Section D), which perhaps forced him to leave India for good to try to strike at the British India Government from abroad. This in turn meant that Bose could not be in India when Congress establishment readily yielded to pressure from Britain and Muslim communalism to partition India. Bose was dead set against dividing India, so had he been present, it is safe to conjecture that he would have resisted the partition through mass mobilization. Bengal paid one of the heaviest human costs encountered in history for partition of India.
The policies that G. D. Birla helped British enact (Section C) exacerbated discrimination and persecution of Hindus and therefore prepared the ground for partition, along with Muslim communalism. In a sequel we show that Birla envisioned partition long before Muslim League publicly demanded it. Big business in general and Birla in particular saw partition as an economically sound choice, as they assessed that it would enhance the ease of business in the part that remained in India. The choice of partition would also further their own business interests because British wanted to divide India before it left and serving British interests would continue British patronage for them. Britain would continue to have strong influence in the whole world at least in the foreseeable future after leaving India. And their business empires had grown to their then state, in part due to British patronage. Their analysis ignored the human cost of the same and how it would sever parts of an ancient civilizational nation and thereby disassociate the resulting states from the essence of the nation. Subsequently Big business in general and Birla in particular used their influence on Congress to ensure that it meekly accepts partition going against the mandate it received from Hindus in 1946 for averting partition. This was nothing short of a civilizational betrayal.
Once partition of India was decided upon, partition of Bengal and Punjab was necessary for giving a lifeline to Indics. Birla may have funded moves to ensure the same for Bengal, which may be why the history advisors of Prime Minister Modi counseled him to include Birla’s name among proponents of Bengali Hindu homeland in India. But both states could have survived in their united form in undivided India had India not been divided. Thus, G. D. Birla should not get credit for alleviating a problem he helped create in the first place.
We hope that the Prime Minister kindly reassesses the contributions of G. D. Birla vis a vis Bengal and India, which should be distinct from enabling Birla businesses to grow and flourish anywhere in India including Bengal.
We have utilized primary sources such as G. D. Birla’s, Gandhi’s, Subhas Chandra Bose’s, Dr Shyamaprasad Bose’s and revolutionary Manmatha Nath Gupta’s writings and correspondences. Among secondary sources, we have drawn from a biography of G. D. Birla by Medha M. Kudaisiya [14] who was given access to G. D. Birla’s private papers by the Birla family. We have also drawn from an acclaimed business history book written by Markovits [15], and a comprehensive biography of Subhas Chandra Bose and Sarat Chandra Bose written by Leonard Gordon [9]. We have extensively reproduced direct quotes with citations to substantiate our conclusions.
Section B: Did G. D. Birla belong to Bengal ?
G. D. Birla did not like Bengali Hindus and had been divesting from Bengal since 1930s. He was relieved when the divestment was complete, which was by 1940s. He had only small operations left in Bengal by 1940s. Kudaisiya has written: “After the direct action day, Birla became convinced that Bengal was no longer a safe place for either business or industry, since it had ’48 % destructive minded Hindus and 52% fanatic Muslims’, and therefore ‘it is not going to be a helpful place for any large scale industry’. He had been keen to move out of Calcutta. He had been diversifying his operations and planning their relocation to either Gwalior or to the Bombay regions from the late 1930s and early 1940s. His major industrial assets in Bengal were the headquarters of the Birla brothers, one jute mill and his Textile Machinery Company (Texmaco). Birla later claimed to a business associate, with relief, that all he had in Calcutta were 2000 clerks. ” He had begun to feel that, in any case, the Bengali Hindu was definitely unfriendly towards Marwari business and, since Marwaris were men of property, they were much more vulnerable to communal arson, especially when their own Hindu brethren were not particularly co-operative” p. 240, [14]. This passage clearly outlines that for Birla, the Marwari businesses and their interests alone constituted his professional and ethnic identity. Thus, Birla’s sentiment about relation between Bengalis and Marwari businesses precludes any fondness for the land he lived in.
Birlas treated Bengal as a land of exile. Acharya Prafulla Chandra Ray has written in his memoir: “The Birla Brothers reap no inconsiderable portion of their golden harvest in Bengal, but then Bengal is to them a land of exile” p. 529, [24]. Driven by this sentiment, they donated primarily to educational institutions in their ancestral village rather than where they earned their fortune in. In words of Acharya Roy, “Thus, while the benefaction [by Birlas] to the Calcutta University is only the paltry sum of rupees twenty-six thousand, that spent in the native village of the Birlas amounts to the huge figure of twelve lakhs” pp. 528-529, [24]. Acharya Roy attributed this distinction to clannishness and parochial mentality: “…they find it impossible to shake off their inborn clannish and parochial mentality” p. 529, [24].
Section C: G. D. Birla’s enormous influence on Gandhi and his coterie
G. D. Birla was widely accepted as an insider in the Gandhi camp – a Gandhi-man in his own words p. 162, [14], p. 259, [12]. In the words of Kudaisiya, “many British politicians regarded him as an insider in the Gandhian establishment” p. 172, [14]. He was extremely close to Gandhi and prominent members of his coterie, like Rajendra Prasad, C. Rajagopalachari and Vallabhbhai Patel. The proximity was founded on generous monetary support from Birla and personal favors including personal loans. The proximity ensured that Birla had intimate knowledge of expenses of Congress and interactions between Gandhi and top Congress leaders, and a decisive say on Congress policies and on interactions of Gandhi and his coterie with other top Congress leaders. Birla also served as Gandhi’s emissary to the British. He was in short indispensable to Gandhi’s operation (eg, last paragraph of this section). We establish and elucidate each of the above contentions below.
G. D. Birla regularly donated to M. Gandhi – this can be seen from the correspondences he reproduced in his book pp. 7-16, 32-34, 88, 98, 101, 118, 170, 201, 226, 263 [12]. In the period between January 1930 and March 1931, he gave between one and five lakh rupees according to the estimate of a high British official p. 72, [15]. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who was a close associate of both M. Gandhi and Birla, wrote in the foreward to a book authored by the last: Birla “always stood for us during our struggle for freedom, and helped us, whenever required, by contribution’’ and “Gandhiji in fact never hesitated to draw on their [Birlas] resources when it was necessary to do so, nor did they [Birlas] ever hesitate to put their resources at his disposal’’ [12].
M. Gandhi and his coterie regularly stayed at Birla houses in different parts of India. His correspondences were regularly directed to and from Birla houses p. 130, p. 144 [6]. He was assassinated in Birla house in Delhi. His staunch follower Vallabhbhai Patel also died in Birla house p. X1X, [12]. His secretary Mahadev Desai met British representatives (Mr. Laithwaite, Viceroy’s secretary) at Birla house p. 243, [5].
Gandhi and his coterie (eg, C. Rajagopalachari, Rajendra Prasad) had several personal conflicts of interests with G. D. Birla. Gandhi’s son, Devdas Gandhi, who was also C. Rajagopalachari’s son-in-law, worked as an editor in Birla’s Hindustan Times between 1935-1950. Rajagopalachari got to know Birla through Gandhi, and by 1930, considered Birla close enough to ask him for help to find employment for his eldest son in law, Varadarajan. Rajagopalachari served as a trustee of Birla’s trust Krishnarpan, which was engaged in charitable work. Birla had provided a personal loan of Rs.45,000 to Rajendra Prasad in 1936, when his family was experiencing financial troubles. The transaction was managed through Jamanlal Bajaj, yet another businessman and a member of the Congress Working Committee, to avoid criticism from Rajendra Prasad’s political colleagues pp. 163-164, [14].
G. D. Birla’s correspondences with Gandhi and his coterie reveal that he regularly informed them of the moves of their political rivals within Congress, eg, Subhas Chandra Bose, and was kept in the loop about Gandhi’s interactions with other Congress leaders, and instructed/suggested top Congressmen like Patel on how to deal with other eminent Congress leaders like former Congress Presidents and Birla’s instructions were complied with promptly (read Section F). Gandhi overrode the advices of senior Congressmen like Subhas Chandra Bose on crucial policy issues to comply with Birla’s counsel (read Section D). He also rejected Jawaharlal Nehru’s officially stated position to comply with Birla’s entreaties. Specifically, in August-September 1935, Birla had requested M. Gandhi that the Congress not take decisions about the new constitution until the new Viceroy, Linlithgow, had taken charge. Gandhi had then promised him that no new commitments about the reforms would be made at the Lucknow Congress session pp. 168-169, [14]. This is exactly what happened in the Lucknow session of Congress in 1935, presided by Jawaarlal Nehru. Birla wrote to P. Thakurdas about this session: “Mahatmaji kept his promise and without his uttering a word, he saw that no new commitments were made. Jawaharlalji’s speech in a way was thrown into the waste paper basket because all the resolutions that were passed were against the spirit of his speech….It must be said, however, to the credit of Jawaharlalji that he fully realized his position and did not abuse his powers. The Working Committee which he has constituted consists of an overwhelming majority of Mahatmaji’s group. ‘’ p. 169, [14]. This is also a direct proof that Birla was influencing the policies of Congress through the connivance of Gandhi and Nehru to suit the agenda of the British.
G. D. Birla served as M. Gandhi’s unofficial emissary to the British. As, Dr. Rajendra Prasad writes, “He [Birla] also proved himself to be a trusted exponent of Gandhiji’s viewpoint to many Britisher’s as far as Gandhi’s political program was concerned. One can see from the book how he undertook visit after visit to England on his own and utilised the opportunities for keeping those in places of authority there well informed about the way Gandhiji’s mind was working. He never claimed to act as an appointed agent on behalf of Gandhiji and yet having studied and understood his philosophy and his programme, he took upon himself to convey its implications to those that counted. And it may be said that he succeeded in no small measure in this self-appointed role.’’ p. vi, [12]. Kudaisiya has written, “ By now [1937] Birla enjoyed easy access to important figures in the British political establishment. Many British politicians looked upon him as a personal emissary of Gandhi. Moreover, they regarded him as a conciliator who could be relied upon to work sincerely for the success of the new constitution. …. Birla, therefore, enjoyed an impeccable reputation in London and many British politicians regarded him as an insider in the Gandhian establishment and were more than willing to lend him a serious ear.” p. 172, [14].
G. D. Birla negotiated multiple pacts between the British and Congress, and supported and influenced muliple British laws, which undermined India’s national interests in general and Hindu interests in particular, eg, Gandhi-Irwin Pact (Section E), Communal Award pp. 52-55, 114-115, 160, [12], Poona pact pp. 56-58, [12] , Government of India Act pp. 119-122, [12], Congress’ acceptance of office pp. 181-182, 193, [12], Federation pp. 207-209, [12]. None of these contained any mention of Dominion Status let alone freedom p. 60, [17].
Gandhi asked G. D. Birla to get the accounts of Bengal Pradesh Congress Committee audited (he asked G. D. Birla on 8 May 1929, and reminded him on 26 August, 1929 and 18 September, 1929) pp. 458, [19] , pp, 441, [20], pp.102, [21], p. 204, [5]. This gave Birla direct knowledge of each and every expense of the Congress unit of the state that sent Congress its largest number of delegates.
British government had excluded G. D. Birla (and Jamal Mohammad) from their list of representatives to the second round table conference though FICCI (Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industries) had elected him to represent them there along with Thakurdas pp. 129-130, [14]. Gandhi pulled all stops to include Birla. Kudaisiya writes, “The issue of FICCI’s representation was taken up by Gandhi. He personally took charge of all its correspondence with the government and joined issue with the Viceroy. Gandhi demanded that the government should honor the promise made by Lord Irwin that FICCI should be granted adequate representation at the Round Table Conference. Even more significantly he declared that: My usefulness would be largely curtailed if the interests represented by these three gentlemen….are not to be represented at the Round Table Conference. The Federation is to a certain extent working in conjunction with the Congress…. If there were any negotiations..in connection with Indian commerce I should be perfectly helpless without the assistance and cooperation of these gentlemen and the purpose for which I am being sent to London is in danger of being defeated (Gandhi to Viceroy, 29 August 1931) “ p. 130, [14]. Though Gandhi mentions all three in the above letter, his fervent appeals were really about Birla because Thakurdas was already invited and Gandhi had no particular proximity to Mohammad. As per Birla’s diary dated 17 September, 1931, Gandhi was willing to take up the issue with the British Prime Minister when he did not get a favorable response from Viceroy Willingdon p. 130, [14]. Gandhi’s and FICCI’s persistent advocacy forced the British government to invite Birla in September 1931. But, Birla declined the reluctant invitation p. 130, [14]. In contrast, Gandhi never took up the pardon or commutation of death sentence of any of India’s revolutionaries eg, Gopinath Saha, Bhagat Singh, Rajguru, Sukhdeb, with the British despite fervent appeals in many cases from all over India. For example, Bhagat Singh, Rajguru, Sukhdev had already been sentenced to death by hanging before the negotiation of the Gandhi-Irwin pact, for assassinating police officer Saunders and dropping a bomb in the Delhi assembly. Viceroy Irwin has reported as follows about an interview with Gandhi during the negotiation of the pact : “In conclusion and not connected with the above, he[Gandhi] mentioned the case of Bhagat Singh. He did not plead for commutation, although he would, being opposed to all taking of life, take that course himself. He also thought it would have an influence for peace. ” p. 151, [10] [8]. Gandhi has himself reported as follows about an interview on 18/02/1931 with Irwin: I talked about Bhagat Singh. I told him : “This has no connection with our discussion, and it may even be inappropriate on my part to mention it. But if you want to make the present atmosphere more favourable, you should suspend Bhagat Singh’s execution.” The Viceroy liked this very much. He said : “I am very grateful to you that you have put this thing before me in this manner. Commutation of sentence is a difficult thing, but suspension is certainly worth considering.” I said about Bhagat Singh: “He is undoubtedly a brave man but I would certainly say that he is not in his right mind. However, this is the evil of capital punishment, that it gives no opportunity to such a man to reform himself. I am putting this matter before you as a humanitarian issue and desire suspension of sentence in order that there may not be unnecessary turmoil in the country. I myself would release him, but I cannot expect any Government to do so. I would not take it ill even if you do not give any reply on this issue.” p. 152, [10] [8]. Incidentally, in Delhi, great pressure was brought to bear upon the Mahatma to save the lives of Bhagat Singh and his colleagues. On 14/02/1931, Pt. Madan Mohan Malaviya made a fervent appeal to the Viceroy that Bhagat Singh’s death sentence be commuted to life sentence, saying: “I do so not only because I am opposed on grounds of humanity, but also because the execution of these young men whose action was prompted not by personal or selfish considerations, but by patriotic impulses…’’ p. 20, [7]. The stark contrast in the content and tones of intervention for Birla and revolutionaries attests to the centrality of Birla in Gandhi’s operation.
Section D: G. D. Birla influenced Congress towards enacting or accepting policies that discriminated against Bengali Hindus
Section D.1: Enabling the Discriminatory Communal Award Through the Poona Pact
In the early 1930s the British Government announced laws and proposal, known as Communal Award, that reserved seats in Provincial and Federal Legislatures for different communities, and accorded separate electorates based on the same. Communal Award discriminated against Hindus in general and upper caste Hindus in particular in Bengal and Punjab in terms of their ability to get elected into these legislatures. It made it impossible for Hindus to form governments in these states by themselves. G. D. Birla supported the Communal Award. The dissent against it among Hindus was craftily dissipated by the combination of Gandhi and Birla. Communal award enabled governments in Bengal that heavily discriminated against the Hindu populace, and laid the foundation for partition of India.
Specifically, on 16th April 1932, the Prime Minister of Britain, Ramsay McDonald, declared that in view of the failures of the various parties and communities to reach any agreed proposals, the Government itself had to intervene, and accordingly he was announcing the `Communal Award’. p. 96, [22]. On August 17th 1932, MacDonald announced the terms of the Communal Award which substantially disadvantaged the Hindus in particular and the non-Muslims in general. It reserved seats for Muslims to the extent that Hindus (in particular upper caste Hindus) would henceforth be substantially under-represented as compared to their population in the state legislatures in Bengal and (more specifically non Muslims) in Punjab. For example, in a house of 250 in Bengal, 119 (ie, 47.6% of total seats) seats were reserved for Muslims (then constituting 54.8% of the total population of Bengal) who had separate electorates, non-Muslims (Hindus then comprised 44.8% of the total population of Bengal) were to have 80 seats (ie, 32% of the total seats), 30 of 80 were to be reserved for scheduled castes and 2 for women. p. 318, [9], p. 178, [5]. In the words of Dr. Rajendra Prasad, “In the Punjab also, to give weightage to the Sikhs the Hindus were required to give up a portion of their representation, although they were in a minority and would be entitled to weightage according to ordinary canons of fairness and justice.’’ p. 98, [22], p. 130, [23].
G. D. Birla had wanted legislature seats to be reserved on the basis of population of different religious communities as early as 1927. On 17 October, 1927, he told M. M. Malaviya, “…if possible redistribution of provinces should be made. I do not know whether splitting the Punjab and Bengal would be liked by the people but I would personally welcome it. The West Punjab and the Frontier and Sind might be composed into one province thus giving a decided majority to Mohammadans in East Bengal and the West Punjab and the seats should be reserved on the basis of population…” p. 246, [14]. He justified this discrimination against Hindus of Bengal and Punjab, as “inevitable’’ p. 160, [12]. The letters that he has reproduced in his book reveal that he had been discussing “reforms’’ and “settling the communal question’’ with Lord Lothian during May 1932 pp. 52-55, [12].
Subhas Chandra Bose has noted that in April 1931 Gandhi had encouraged fundamentalist Muslims. He has written: “ [After the Karachi Congress] In private and in public, he began to say that his going to the Round Table Conference depended on his ability to solve the Hindu-Moslem question beforehand. Along with this statement he also began to say that if the Moslems made a united demand on the question of representation, electorate, etc., in the new Constitution, he would accept the demand. The effect of these statements was a most tragic one. After the Delhi (Gandhi-Irwin) Pact, the reactionary Moslems were somewhat overawed by the strength and power of the Congress and they were in a mood to come to terms with that body on a reasonable basis. The first statement of the Mahatma immediately changed that mood and made them feel that they had held the key position, since if they refused to come to an understanding with him, they could prevent his attending the Round Table Conference. The second statement of the Mahatma made the reactionary Moslems feel that if only they would remain firm and secure the support of the Nationalist Moslems, the Mahatma could be forced to accept all their extreme demands. After the above statements have been made, the Mahatma held a conference with some reactionary Moslem leaders in Delhi in April (1931). I was in Delhi at the time and I went to see him the same evening, after the conference. He seemed to be in a depressed mood, because they had presented him with the fourteen demands made by Mr. Jinnah (known in India as Jinnah’s fourteen points) and he felt that an agreement would not be possible on that basis. Thereupon I remarked that the Congress should only care for an agreement between Nationalist Hindus and Nationalist Moslems and the agreed solution should be presented before the Round Table Conference as the Nationalist demand and that the Congress need not bother what other anti-Nationalist elements thought or said. The Mahatma then asked me if I had any objection to separate electorates since it could be argued that in the absence of the third party the different communities would live and work in concord. To this I replied that separate electorates are against the fundamental principles of Nationalism and that I felt so strongly on the subject that even Swaraj on the basis of separate electorates was, in my opinion, not worth having. While we were engaged in this discussion, Dr. Ansari and some of the Nationalist Moslem leaders including Mr. Sherwani, arrived on the scene and joined in the discussion. They said that if for any reason the Mahatma gave up the demand for a common electorate for both Hindus and Moslems and accepted the demand of the reactionaries for a separate electorate for each community, they would oppose the reactionary Moslems and also the Mahatma, because they were convinced that separate electorates were bad not only for the country as a whole, but also for the different communities. The strong attitude of the Nationalist Moslems on this occasion was largely responsible for preventing the Mahatma from agreeing to separate electorates, and forced him to wriggle out of the uncomfortable situation in which he had placed himself (In the light of these facts, the attitude of the Nationalist Moslems in 1934 to the Prime Minister’s Communal Award is inexplicable). Soon after this, the Mahatma issued a public statement saying that he could not accept the demands made by the communalist Moslem leaders, since the Nationalist Moslems were opposed to them” pp. 237-238, [1]. Thus, Gandhi did not appear to be fundamentally opposed to separate electorates in 1931. At that point, Nationalist Muslims opposed such division though they changed stance in a year. Gandhi’s positions have never fundamentally differed from Birla’s. It may therefore be legitimately conjectured that these were also Birla’s positions then, and Britain was emboldened to institute this discrimination given the support from influential quarters of Congress and big business.
Prominent Hindus of Bengal eg, Subhas Chandra Bose, Rabindranath Thakur, Shyamaprasad Mookerjee, felt wounded and wronged by the Communal Award p. 318, [9]. Bose has described how the Communal Award discriminated against Hindus and he opposed it on the same count:
- Bengal Hindus have been suffering from a just grievance because the Communal Award have allotted them only 80 seats out of 250 in the new Legislature, while Moslems have been given 119 seats (Under the existing Constitution, Hindus have 60 per cent of the elected seats in the Bengal Legislative Council. This is in accordance with the Lucknow Pact of 1916 – the agreement arrived at between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Moslem League) pp. 299-300, [1].
- “In Bengal and Punjab a statutory majority has been virtually provided for the majority community – the Moslems, without giving the Hindu minority representation according to their population such as the Moslem minorities in all provinces have received” p.. 322, [1].
- “One-third of the British-Indian seats in the Council of State will be reserved for the Moslem community, though their population is approximately only one-fourth of the entire population of British India.’’ p. 313, [1]
- “The whole object of the Communal Award embodied in the White Paper seems to be to divide India still further, so that the effect of the meagre constitutional reforms may be sufficiently neutralised. Attempt has been made to provide representation in such a manner that the points of difference among the Indian people, if any, will be given exaggerated expression in the Legislatures and not their points of agreement. The entire scheme is based on the pernicious principle of ‘Divide and Rule’. In trying to divide the people, attempt has naturally been made to placate these elements- the Moslems, for instance- who according to the official estimate, are likely to be more pro-British than the others. “ pp. 322-323, [1].
The dissent against the insidious Communal Award in Bengal and elsewhere was craftily dissipated by Gandhi and G. D. Birla. Rather than objecting to the Communal Award as a whole, the electoral discrimination against Hindus or even non Muslims as a whole in at least Bengal and Punjab, the principle of separate electorate itself, Gandhi started a hunger strike only against creating electorates for scheduled castes. By fasting only against the separation of electorates among the Hindus, and not between the Hindus and Muslims advocated in the Communal Award, Gandhi in fact legitimized the two-nation theory, that Hindus and Muslims are in fact distinct nations, and therefore need to vote separately. The attention of the entire nation and the media discourse shifted entirely to his fast and the specific clause he was objecting to. The fast resulted in the Poona pact, signed on 24 September, 1932. The Poona Pact put the caste Hindus at a further disadvantage by reserving 148 seats in the Provincial legislatures for the scheduled castes as against 71 granted under the Communal Award. The seats which were in excess of what was due to the scheduled castes on the basis of their population p. 149, [4] were given out of the Hindu quota – the Muslim quota was not touched. The Poona Pact therefore gave a free pass to the discrimination against Hindus in favor of Muslims in the Communal Award and the divisive concept of separate electorates. Subhas Chandra Bose has written about the Poona Pact: “As long as the Mahatma was on fast, rational thinking was completely suspended and the one thought of his countrymen was how to save his life. Once he was out of danger, people began to examine the Poona Agreement in the cold light of reason. Then it was realized that while the Communal Award provided 71 seats in the Provincial Legislatures for the depressed classes, the Poona Agreement had provided 148. These additional seats would be given them at the expense of the rest of the Hindu community. In provinces like Bengal, where Hindus had already been unjustly treated in the award, the Poona agreement was regarded as further injustice by the rest of the Hindu community – particularly in view of the fact that the depressed classes problem hardly existed there. Moreover, it was realized that the Poona agreement had not done away with separate electorate altogether. People began to ask seriously if, after all, it was worthwhile for Mahatma Gandhi to have staked his life for such an issue, especially when the Communal Award was from start to finish an objectionable document” p. 275, [1].
Dr. Shyamaprasad Mookerjee of Hindu Mahasabha has written in his diary about the Communal Award-Poona Pact enactment: “Bengal was really crushed under the Communal Award. A separate electorate was provided with a vengeance for the majority community in Bengal. The number of seats allotted to Muslims was about forty-nine per cent in the Provincial Assembly while the Lucknow Pact of 1916 gave them forty per cent. The minority Hindus had no weightage ; the non-official Europeans had about twenty-five seats. The Hindus were still divided under the Poona Pact ; thirty seats going to the Scheduled Castes while only ten were provided under the original White Paper. Thus the Hindus for their advanced views and extreme nationalism, were so punished as to be thrown at the mercy of a highly reactionary communal majority, unalterable even by an appeal to the electorate” pp. 36-37, [28].
G. D. Birla had helped negotiate the Poona Pact. He has written that “The history of the [Poona] pact with Ambedkar need not be detailed here. I had quite a good hand in getting it concluded.’’ p. 58, [12].
Section D.2: Enabling the continuation of the Muslim League Government Headed by Fazlul Huq
The Communal Award, modified through Poona Pact, ruled out the possibility of Hindus forming governments by themselves in Bengal. The 1937 government in Bengal was accordingly an alliance between Muslim League and a local Muslim Party of Bengal, Krishak Praja Party (KPP) headed by the leader of KPP, Fazlul Huq. The Muslim League-KPP coalition government was formed in the first place because Congress High Command would not allow a Congress-KPP coalition in Bengal. In the words of Dr Shyamaprasad Mookerjee, as noted in his diary, “After the 1937 elections, the Congress swept the polls so far as the Hindu seats were concerned. In Bengal, as elsewhere, the Muslim League did not cut much ice. Fazlul Haq was certainly stronger here and his Krishak Praja Party came to the Legislature with a fairly large representation. He defeated Nazimuddin at Patuakhali and it looked as if the reactionary elements among the Muslims had received a death blow. Fazlul Haq, lovable and emotional as he is, was dying for power. He had been so long kept far away from Government Counsels, the Europeans not trusting him. He did not wish to fall into the arms of the League. He implored the Congress to form a coalition ministry in Bengal with himself as Premier. If this had been done, Bengal would never have gone under the heels of League-cum British conspiracy. The province would have developed into a strong and healthy province with the common efforts of representative Hindus and Muslims. The High Command of the Congress did not allow this to be done. Congress policy regarding acceptance of office was still uncertain. Fazlul Haq could not wait indefinitely. He joined the League and a solid Muslim front was created. pp. 37-38, [28]. Leonard Gordon has also written that Huq himself “did not want to be controlled by extra-bengal forces and leaders. However, he did not have a real alternative as yet.” p. 361, [9].
The Muslim League-KPP government blatantly discriminated against Hindus of Bengal. Their overt focus on religion detracted from fulfilling the social commitments which constituted the plank on which KPP won. This caused dissent within KPP. Utilizing this dissent, Subhas Chandra Bose and his elder brother Sarat Chandra Bose, who was an eminent leader of Bengal Congress, wanted to fell the Muslim League-KPP government, and have Congress form a coalition government with KPP, with or without Huq. They believed that removing KPP and Huq from the clutches of Muslim League and the presence of Congress in the coalition government would curtail the communalism of the government. The Bose brothers weaned away members of the government, lobbied with Congress President and Gandhi to authorize the breaking of the coalition government and formation of Congress-KPP coalition government. Gandhi was initially amenable to the idea, but was persuaded out of it by G. D. Birla and possibly Maulana Azad. Accordingly Gandhi vetoed the felling of the existing government and Congress’ entrance into the coalition. As a result, the Muslim League-KPP government continued in power and continued to discriminate against and disempower Hindus of Bengal, which laid the groundwork for partition of India and Bengal. We establish these contentions below.
Section D.2.1: Discrimination against Hindus of Bengal under Muslim League-KPP Government
Leonard Gordon has written: “After Fazlul Huq had made his bargain with the Muslim League and then joined it, he became, however willingly, more and more their captive and spokesman. … His cabinet included several of the most important Urdu-speaking Muslims of the province, two representatives of the Hindu landlords, and Sarker, a prominent businessman.” pp. 361-363, [9]. Subhas Chandra Bose had written about this discrimination. When he was illegally incarcerated, in Presidency jail, he announced a fast unto death in protest. He wrote to the Superintendent of Prison on 30.9.1940: “There is no other alternative for me but to register a moral protest against an unjust act and as a proof of that protest, to undertake a voluntary fast. This fast will have no effect on the `popular’ ministry, because I am neither the Maulavi of Murapara, Dacca nor a Muhammadan by faith. Consequently, the fast will, in my case, become a fast unto death. … My protest will serve to expose the hypocrisy underlying their policy in this unfortunate country-as also the policy of a Provincial Government that calls itself `popular’, but which in reality, can be moved only when there is a Muhammadan in the picture’pp. 187-189, [2]. In the words of Gordon: “A foremost concern, perhaps even the concern of the Boses (Subhas and Sarat), at least as far as Bengal was concerned, was the growing communalization in the province, spurred on, they believed by the reactionary Muslim League ministry running and ruining their beloved Bengal. Early in the Huq ministry (August 14, 1937), Sarat Bose wrote to Congress President, Nehru, `….The present ministry is far more reactionary than its predecessors under the old Act and unless we are able to break it, the future of Bengal is doomed” p. 361, [9].
Dr. Shyamaprasad Mookerjee has written in his diary about the then situation in Bengal: “N. R. Sarkar, B. P. Singh Roy and Maharaja of Cossimbazar were the Caste Hindu ministers [in the Muslim League-KPP ministry]. They could hardly exercise any restraining influence. The tiger had tasted blood and fanatic zeal was let loose on the province. Fazlul Haq was made to dance as the clever Leaguers like Suhrawardy, Sahabuddin and Nazimuddin wanted him to. Using him as their cloak, they organised themselves and the League effectively, and carried on ruthlessly their campaign of denuding Hindus of their rights, on which alone they thought they could build their Islamic structure” pp. 37-38, [28]. He had said on the floor of the legislature, “Government…. decided… that the way to best serve the interests of Bengal which will plan a basis of administration which will be entirely or principally communal in character….this was perhaps done with the belief of convincing the Muslim members of this House and the Muslim population of Bengal that the Government of the day were really intending to look after the interests of the Muslims themselves. I have no desire here to relate in detail the manner in which the rights and liberties of one particular community have been trampled under foot….there has spread….a state of insecurity unparalleled in the history of Bengal. The cry of Islam in danger was shamelessly raised at every time when Government found their policy and action were ruthlessly exposed….the part played by Mr A. K. Fazlul Huq…was entirely unworthy of the position which he occupies. Bengal expected better of him.’’ pp. 363-364, [9].
A leader of Fazlul Huq’s own party, KPP, Tamizuddin Khan, said in the debate referred to above: “…far from raising their little finger to solve the difficult problem of the province the Ministry have been deliberately pursuing a policy that has already made the communal tension far worse than what it was when they assumed office. A false and insidious cry of religion in danger has been raised and this has poisoned the very atmosphere of the country. The Ministry, to keep itself in office, is fostering that cry and has all but dragged the country into the mouth of a volcano. Freedom of opinion and speech and other civil liberties of the people have been endangered as never before. Intimidation and assault has taken the place of reason and argument….How long should Bengal be allowed to groan under the dead weight of a ministry like this? When will Bengal get rid of this nightmare? ‘’ pp. 363-364, [9]. As per Gordon, “The whole opposition, from S. P. Mookerjee of the Hindu Mahasabha to the KPP leaders, agreed that the ministry was fanning the flames of communalization for its benefit. They appointed men of the right `community’ but of inferior abilities, as Sir Robert Reid, senior ICS officer serving as acting governor, noted in his memoirs.” pp. 363-364, [9]. Sarat Bose noted, “… Can there be the least doubt that some members of the present Ministry have not raised their little finger against the writers of poisonous leaflets, such as those which have been placed before the House….If they have not taken any action, can they possibly escape the charge that they are responsible for bringing about an atmosphere of violence in the city?’’ p. 365, [9].
Then in 1937, the Huq ministry had drawn up a Calcutta Municipal (Amendment) Bill which changed the overall joint electorate to separate electorate for Muslims, increased the reservation for them in the Corporation, reserved certain posts in the Corporation for them and the scheduled castes, and gave their Bengal government more control over the selection of the chief executive officer. The bill was introduced in the Bengal assembly in 1938 p. 369, [9].
Section D.2.2: How the Bose brothers tried to oust the Muslim League-KPP ministry and form a Congress-KPP ministry
The Congress Party, which was led by Bose brothers in Bengal, opposed the Muslim League-KPP ministry throughout, but it was not enough. As per Dr. Shyamaprasad Mookerjee’s reordings in his diary, “The Congress Party opposed the ministry vigorously, but the ministry used the immense patronage at its disposal for consolidating its position.” p. 38, [28].
To avert the impending doom confronting Bengal, the Bose brothers wanted to oust the Muslim League ministry utilizing the dissent against Fazlul Huq from within his party. They wanted Congress to enter a coalition ministry with a breakaway faction of Huq’s own party, KPP. With Congress in coalition, the Muslim communalization could be checked. On August 14, 1937, Sarat Bose wrote to Congress President, Nehru, “If we are to break the present reactionary Ministry we have to enter into some sort of alliance with those groups in the Assembly who will agree to work the Congress programme in the legislature. The present ministry is far more reactionary than its predecessors under the old Act and unless we are able to break it, the future of Bengal is doomed. At the present moment, the left wingers of the Proja Party numbering between 20 to 25, are voting with us. We shall get further recruits if it is announced that the Working Committee will authorize alliance with other groups who will accept the Congress policy and programme. The two most mischievous persons in the present cabinet are Sir Khwaja Nazimuddin and Mr. Nalini Ranjan Sircar. The latter has sedulously spread the report that the Working Committee will, in no event, sanction alliances and that has had the effect of isolating the Congress Party. I have had long discussions on the subject with Srijuts T. C. Goswami and Jogesh C. Gupta and the former will place the whole matter before the Working Committee. Something has to be done to strengthen the Congress Party and it should be done immediately.’’ pp. 31-363 [9].
Gordon has written that: “Within little more than a year, the foremost KPP member besides Huq, Syed Nausher Ali, was squeezed out. He (Ali) believed that the cabinet would never put through fundamental planks of the KPP program and that Huq’s allegiance has now shifted to the Muslim League. A large group, at least half, of the KPP members in the Bengal Assembly left the coalition party and went into the opposition and were now linked to the Congress with Sarat Bose as the leader of the entire opposition.’’ pp. 361-363, [9]. Though Subhas Chandra Bose had in general opposed Congress entering the ministries, Sarat Bose and he “worked assiduously to persuade National Congress leaders and non-Congressmen in Bengal to allow the Bengal Congress to make a coalition ministry. Otherwise they feared that the communal divide would become sharper and sharper and, as Sarat said, `Bengal is doomed’. p. 362, [9]. The Congress, the section of KPP that deserted Huq, Hindu Mahasabha, scheduled caste independents – all opposed Huq p. 363, [9]. “Abdul Hakeem, a KPP member, mocked Huq, noting that his main accomplishments were the introduction of dog racing at Behala and an expensive plan for a new building for the Bengal legislative council. What had happened, he asked, to the priority for free primary education, a KPP proposal, on the basis of which, along with the abolition of the Permanent Settlement, Huq had been elected?” pp. 363-364, [9]. As stated before, KPP leader Tamizuddin and Hindu Mahasabha leader S. P. Mookerjee had also opposed the Huq Government. To curtail the dissent from within KPP, in November 1938, , Huq incorporated two KPP stalwarts, Tamizuddin Khan and Shamsuddin Ahmed, in his ministry. In few months, the latter exited the ministry “with considerable bitterness against the chief minister and his failure to redeem many of his promises.’’ pp. 366-367, [9].
By the second week of December, 1938, then Congress President, Subhas Chandra Bose, had convinced Nalini Sarkar to resign from the Huq ministry p. 124, [6], and subsequently Bose met Gandhi in Wardha to press for a Congress-KPP coalition in Bengal involving the section of KPP that was disgruntled with Huq pp. 122-123, [6].
Section D.2.3: How G. D. Birla ensured the continuation of the Muslim League-KPP ministry
Gandhi initially agreed to Bose’s proposal of ousting the Muslim League-KPP coalition and replacing it with Congress-KPP coalition, but later retracted, persuaded by his confidants G. D. Birla, Moulana Azad and N. R. Sarkar pp. 122-123, [6]. On December 18, 1938 p. 367, [9], Gandhi supported the Municipal reform bill that discriminated against Hindus and vetoed the ousting of the Muslim League Ministry headed by Huq. In a letter to Bose, (delivered by Birla). Gandhi wrote: “I must dictate this as I am wilfully blind. Whilst I am dictating this Maulana Saheb, Nalini Babu, and Ghanshyamdasji are listening. We had an exhaustive discussion over the Bengal Ministry. I am more than ever convinced that we should not aim at ousting the Ministry. We shall gain nothing by a reshuffle. And probably we shall lose much by including Congressmen in the Ministry. I feel, therefore, that the best way of securing comparative purity of administration and continuity of a settled programme and policy would be to aim at having all the reforms that we desire carried out by the present Ministry. Nalini Babu should come out, as he says he would, on a real issue being raised and the decision being taken by the Ministry against the interests of the country. His retirement from the Ministry would then be dignified and wholly justified. ….I understand that so far as the amendment of the municipal law is concerned, separate electorate for the scheduled class is given up. There is still insistence on separate electorate for Mussalmans. I do not know whether opposition should be taken to the breaking point. If the Mussalman opinion is solid in favour of separation, I think it would be wisdom to satisfy them. I would not like them to carry the point in the teeth of the Congress opposition. ….Maulana Saheb is in entire agreement with this opinion and so are Nalini Babu and Ghanshyamdas’’ pp. 325-326, [3]. So, along with Moulana Azad and Nalini Sarkar, Birla also opposed the ouster of the Muslim League Government and supported the Municipal Amendment Bill that discriminated against Hindus. Who among the trio was the principal influence on Gandhi vis a vis this decision? The follow up letter from Bose rules out Sarkar.
On 21st December, 1938, Bose wrote back to Gandhi: “The letter which Sjt. G. D. Birla brought from Wardha came as a profound shock to me. I remember to have discussed the Bengal situation with you time and again. The other day at Wardha it was discussed between us once again. My brother Sarat also discussed the matter with you. Both of us have the clear impression that you have always agreed with the idea of a Coalition Ministry for Bengal. I do not know what has happened since I left Wardha to make you alter your view so completely that you now write – `I am more than ever convinced that he should not aim at ousting the ministry, etc.’ The papers say that after I left Wardha, Sjt. N. R. Sarkar, Sjt. G. D. Birla, and Moulana Azad Sahib have seen you. Evidently you have altered your view after talking to them. The position, therefore, is that you attach more value and importance to the views of these three gentlemen than to the views of those who are responsible for running the Congress organisation in Bengal. ….To come straight to the point – there is a fundamental difference between Moulana Sahib and myself on the point at issue…..Moulana Sahib’s view seems to be that in the Muslim majority provinces like Bengal, the communal-Muslim ministries should not be disturbed. The Huq Ministry and the Sikander Hyat Ministry should be allowed to continue in office. Moulana Sahib is evidently unhappy over our lending support to the Allah Bux Ministry in Sindh. I hold, on the contrary, that it is my imperative in the national interest that we should pull down the Huq Ministry as early as possible. The longer this reactionary Ministry remains in office, the more communal will the atmosphere of Bengal become and the weaker will the Congress grow, vis-à-vis the Muslim League. The same argument applies to the Sikander Hyat Ministry also. At long last, early in November, Sjt. Nalini Sarkar had been convinced that he should resign from the Huq ministry. He assured me for the last time on 9th December, before I left Calcutta for Wardha, that he should resign his office before the next budget session. What made him resile from that position within one week, I do not know. Your influence is going to be used not to get Nalini Babu to resign but to get him to stick to office at a time when even his closest friends want him to get out of the Huq ministry. It has astonished me that you did not feel it necessary to even consult me before you arrived at a decision on such a serious matter. … those who are responsible for running the Congress organisation in Bengal should be treated with more consideration and their work should not be sabotaged by other people who seem to delight in ignoring the provincial authorities whenever they have a chance to do so. ….In conclusion, I may say that I feel so strongly on this point that a contrary policy appears to me to be suicidal. I hope that after you reconsider the matter, you will find it possible to let us continue along the above lines and give us your blessings. On the contrary, if you still adhere to the decision contained in your letter, I shall beg you to permit me to relieve myself of my present responsibilities at an early date for I cannot be a party to a policy which I sincerely believe is harmful to the national interest.’’ pp. 122-126, [6].
Bose’s letter shows how hard he lobbied with Gandhi to reverse his veto on his attempt to oust the Muslim League-KPP ministry. His pleas to Gandhi however fell on deaf ears as Gandhian veto, or perhaps Birla veto through Gandhi, held firm. And, the Huq ministry continued in office only to further discriminate against the Hindus of Bengal. The Calcutta Municipal Amendment Bill was passed in February 1939. The bill became one insidious consequence of allowing Huq to continue in office. The Hindu community of Bengal, and most of its political elite (including the Boses) bitterly opposed the bill, considering it as yet another example of Huq’s divisive politics and manifesting bias against the Hindus of Bengal. But, to no avail. p. 369, [9].
Dr Shyamaprasad Mookerjee has written about how India may not have been divided if the Congress High Command allowed Bengal Congress to form a coalition government with KPP: “If the Congress High Command and the Bengal Congress had joined with F. H. [Fazlul Huq] in 1937, Bengal would have been a different province altogether. In other provinces, after three months, the Congress did accept office, but Bengal was already thrown at the mercy of European (British) – cum League domination. … Now in 1944, to placate the League, Gandhi and Rajagopalachari we’re prepared to agree to the principle of India’s partition. If in 1937 they had only allowed coalition ministries with the League, India’s political history would have been different” p. 38, [28]. So G. D. Birla’s veto through Gandhi actually led India to partition if Dr Mookerjee is to be believed.
Section D.3: Why did G.D. Birla push Congress towards accepting or enacting policies that were disastrous for Bengali Hindus?: Conjectures
The explanation could be that motivated by an organic dislike for Bengali Hindus G. D. Birla wished to destroy them. Or, it could be that he wanted India to be divided and exacerbation of discrimination against Hindus in provinces with even small Muslim majority would make partition more palatable to Hindus. Or, he may just have wanted more power for Muslim League given his friendship with the leaders therein. He was a friend of Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Secretary of the Muslim League (and later prime minister of Pakistan), and had a very good opinion of Khan, as per his own writing (on 26 January, 1939) p. 217, [13]. Also, the Huq ministry was supported by the Europeans – Sir George Campbell, their spokesman, harshly criticized the KPP members who had deserted Huq and called Congress “the great Hindu Party” p. 364, [9]. And, Birla assiduously followed British preferences. It may also be a combination of these reasons.
The Congress Party opposed the ministry vigorously, but the ministry used the immense patronage at its disposal for consolidating its position. If the Congress High Command and the Bengal Congress had joined with F. H. in 1937, Bengal would have been a different province altogether. In other provinces, after three months, the Congress did accept office, but Bengal was already thrown at the mercy of European (British) – cum League domination. … Now in 1944, to placate the League, Gandhi and Rajagopalachari we’re prepared to agree to the principle of India’s partition. If in 1937 they had only allowed coalition ministries with the League, India’s political history would have been different p. 38
Section E: G. D. Birla’s war against revolutionary freedom fighters
As a young man G. D. Birla had established links with eminent Bengal revolutionary freedom fighters, which led to an entanglement in a daring revolutionary heist. British Government issued a warrant for his arrest and he had to abscond for three months until his family elders could get the warrant rescinded through the intervention of a notorious British intelligence officer, Charles Tegart and intermediaries trusted by the British political establishment. Subjected to this minor wrap in the knuckles, considering his business interests, he relinquished all ties with the revolutionary movement (Section E.1). In the next few years, when protests against the repressive Rowlatt act rocked Kolkata, he remained indifferent to it, and even mildly supported its draconian provisions which were enacted to crush the revolutionary movement (Section E.2). In the next few years he was fully rehabilitated in the trust-structure of the British political establishment, and simultaneously his passive animosity to the revolutionary movement evolved to active opposition. He now helped British enact repressive measures against Bengal revolutionaries and their support system as a member of the Bengal Legislative Council (Section E.3), mediated between Gandhi and the British to isolate the revolutionary freedom fighters from the mainstream freedom fight leading to the Gandhi-Irwin Pact and continued the same efforts even post the pact (Section E.4). Since the revolutionary movement was the strongest in Bengal among entire India, Bengalis bore the brunt of the excesses he ushered in.
G. D. Birla’s response to one arrest warrant and associated inconvenience of absconding, points to the strength of resolve and character of revolutionary freedom fighters who remained steadfast to their missions to end British rule braving arrest, torture, deportation or even facing death. One wonders why Birla is never pilloried by the Congress-left ecosystem for this abject surrender in the face of a minor inconvenience, though their favorite whipping boy Veer Savarkar is mercilessly ridiculed for writing mercy petitions from the dreaded Cellular Jail. Savarkar was at least deported to Cellular showing that British deemed him a serious threat to their empire at some point, while a warrant and its rescission at interventions of trusted intermediaries tells us that British never took Birla’s revolutionary potential seriously. More, Birla’s extensive dealings with the British post his minor revolutionary interlude shows that British trusted him fully, which they never did for Savarkar. One wonders then if the Indian left is really against Big Business as it claims to be?
Section E.1: How one arrest warrant ended G D Birla’s nascent revolutionary career
In the first half of the twentieth century, Bengal was the hotbed of revolutionary freedom fight. As such, some young Marwaris living in Kolkata formed tenuous links with the revolutionaries p. 36, [14]. Two organizations of the Marwaris, the Marwari Sahayak Samiti and Hindu club helped forge those links. G. D. Birla had been deeply involved with their activities and his friends have been at the core of these two organizations p. 36, [14]. He and his elder brother Jugalkishor Birla had been Presidents of the Marwari Sahayak Samiti from its founding until 1916 pp. 36, 53, [14]. Hanuman Prasad Poddar, Onkarmal Saraf, Prabhu Dayal Himmatsinghka, a close associate of G. D. Birla were all founder members of the Marwari Sahayak Samiti pp. 52, 53, [14]. Kudaisiya notes, “ It was fashionable for the young men in that era to be sympathetic with the revolutionaries. Although the fervor often lasted only so far as not to cause a major disruption in their lifestyle, it is not surprising that several young members of the Marwari Sahayak Samiti and the Hindu Club came under the spell of revolutionary propaganda.” p. 36, [14]. The Hindu Club had been declared an illegal body p. 36, [14]. In 1916 extremist leader Tilak was called to address the Marwari Sahayak Samiti p. 53, [14]. Young Marwari men had occasionally helped the Bengali revolutionaries financially. For example, Poddar, was a member of the Anushilan Samiti, helped it financially and regularly participated in its meetings. Saraf was known to be a close associate of a famous Bengali revolutionary, Ashutosh Lahiri p. 36, [14]. Kudaisiya writes, “ It was rumored that the famous Bengali revolutionary Aurobindo Ghosh used to receive regular financial contributions from sympathizers in Bara Bazaar. …. Bipin Ganguli and other extremists were known to patronize the Marwari Sahayak Samiti and it was rumored that they sometimes even addressed its meetings.” p. 36, [14].
In August, 1914, a consignment of arms belonging to Rodda & Co., a prominent arms dealer of Calcutta, were stolen, allegedly by Bipin Ganguli p. 36, [14]. Kudaisiya writes, “About 202 cases of arms and ammunition were cleared by a clerk of Rodda & Co. from Customs, but only 192 cases were delivered to the company’s warehouse. The missing ten cases contained 50 Mauser pistols and 46000 rounds of ammunition. As many as 44 pistols were quickly distributed to nine revolutionary groups in Bengal and officials suspected that they were subsequently used in 54 cases of political dacoity or murder” p. 53, [14]. The Sedition Committee of 1918, headed by Justice Rowlatt, later declared the Rodda case as an ‘event of the greatest importance in the development of revolutionary crime in Bengal’. ‘Few, if any, revolutionary outrages have taken place in Bengal’, it continued, ‘since August 1914, in which Mauser pistols stolen from Rodda and Co. have not been used.’ p. 37, [14].
Right after the theft, the stolen cases were hidden by the Marwari sympathizers of Ganguli. Kudaisiya writes, “The story goes that the crates were then moved from house to house and, at one point, they were hidden at the Birla residence in Zakaria Street. Police enquiries soon confirmed the connivance of the Marwaris “ p. 35, [14]. Kudaisiya continues: “the police seemed to have had evidence that the cache of arms had at one time been hidden with Ghanshyamdas’ connivance at one of his premises. In close circles it was believed that he had assisted the revolutionaries financially but it was difficult to confirm this “ p. 36, [14]. British police searched several premises in Bara Bazaar, the Birla residence in Zakaria Street and their gaddi and warehouse in Harrison Road, Kaligodam pp. 35-36, [14]. The searches yielded 31 pistols from a godown in Badtalla Street in the heart of Bara Bazaar p. 36, [14]. Police issued warrants in the names of prominent members of the Marwari Sahayak Samiti and the Hindu Club: Hanuman Prasad Poddar, Prabhu Dayal Himmatsinghka, Phoolchand Chowdhury, Jawalaprasad Kanodia, Kanhailal Chitlangiya, Onkarmal Saraf and G. D. Birla. Police ordered discontinuation of activities of both the organizations p. 36, [14]. Himmatsinghka was arrested in 1914, but managed to tip off G. D. Birla, who absconded, escaping to Ooty (Ootacamund) in South India, then to Nathdwara, and finally to Pushkar in Rajputana. He remained underground for three months p. 36, [14].
We learn from Kudaisiya how the Marwari community of Kolkata reacted to the developments: “Marwari leadership in Calcutta felt itself to be under a cloud of suspicion. Those were the years of World War I when the Marwaris were beginning to make enormous fortunes in business. The Marwari leadership felt that the younger, recalcitrant members were inviting the wrath of the authorities at such a time of opportunity and endangering the interests of the entire community.” p. 37, [14]. They (including elders in the Birla family) lobbied high officials and important persons close to the authorities so that they rescind the warrant p. 36, [14]. They roped in Sir Kailashchandra Bose, a leading medical practitioner in Bengal, with lucrative practice particularly among the Marwaris. He was by that time a Rai Bahadur, Companion of the Indian Empire, and a Kaiser e Hind Gold Medalist. He had “contacts with high-level British officials’ who were ‘very fond of him’. pp. 36-37, [14]. He would soon become the first Indian doctor to be knighted and receive the Order of the British Empire in due course.
Kudaisiya describes how the Marwaris implicated in the Rodda case were saved from further police actions: “Bose was requested by the family elders to stand guarantee for Ghanshyamdas. Further, Charles Tegart, then a senior official in the Calcutta police, was also approached for help. [This marked the beginning of a long association with Tegart, who rose to become the Commissioner of Police of Calcutta. …. Incidentally, in the 1930s he was retained by Birla to head his business operations in London p. 53, [14].] On Bose’s surety to the Lal Bazar police that Ghanshyamdas had nothing to do with the terrorists, the warrant was finally withdrawn. Ghanshyamdas then returned to Calcutta and resigned from the presidentship of the Marwari Sahayak Samiti “ p. 37, [14]. Upon request of the Marwari leadership, Saraknath Sadhu, the government lawyer, and Puranchand Lahiri, another prominent Calcutta lawyer, interceded on behalf of the accused. Due to this collective effort all five of the warrants, including that of G. D. Birla, were withdrawn p. 37, [14]. Also, Himmatsinghka was arrested in 1914, subsequently in 1916 he was merely externed from Bengal and interned in his house at Dhumka, Bihar, for four years p. 37, [14]. Poddar was merely interned for 21 months and later externed from Bengal p. 52, [14]. Saraf also got off lightly by being only externed from Bengal. In the end one Marwari was sentenced p. 37, [14].
The Kolkata Marwaris in general and G. D. Birla in particular completely disassociated from revolutionary freedom fight after escaping the wrath of British police in Rodda. We first describe the evolution of Birla’s fellow Marwaris implicated in the Rodda heist. Himmatsinghka becme a lifelong associate of Birla. He established a solicitors’ firm at the Calcutta High Court, and became active in social cause such as cow-protection, widow remarriage (for which he was excommunicated along with 12 others). He was elected to Bengal Council in 1927, and thrice between 1937 and 1948. He also participated in the 1942 Quit India Movement pp. 51-53, [14]. Poddar left politics and dedicated himself to social work and Hindu causes. He started the Gita Press which promoted the cause of ‘Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan ‘. Saraf, a successful Bara Bazaar trader, became active in social causes such as widow remarriage, for which he was excommunicated by the Marwari Sanatan Dharma (Agarwal) Sabha, He founded the Hindu Relief Club, set up the Sanatan Dharma Pustakalaya in his hometown of Mandava, the Calcutta Industrial Bank and the Marwari Traders’ Association p. 52, [14].
We now describe the evolution of G. D. Birla. The leadership of the Marwari society considered the Marwari Sahayak Samiti as an ignominy upon their community since six of its founder members were arrested in the Rodda case. Kailashchandra Bose was persuaded to become its President to restore its respectability so that ‘ both the government and the public understand that this was not a political organization’ . Upon his advice it was renamed as Marwari Relief Society so that the Samiti tag is removed from its name, as two of Bengal’s premier revolutionary organizations, namely Anushilan Samiti and Jugantar Samiti had Samiti in their names. Kudaisiya writes, “The Society declared that it would only be concerned with social service, and its associated bodies such as the Hindu Club and the Sahitya Sambandhini Sabha, were disbanded” . Birla became its vice-President, and reoriented his politics to align with the new agenda of the Marwari Relief Society. He pursued only strictly non-controversial organizational activities such as educational charities in Rajputana. Kudaisiya writes, “Ghanshyamdas probably felt a sense of gratitude towards those who had shielded him and were now trying to rehabilitate him at Bara Bazaar…. While his interest in politics had been awakened, it made him alive to the risks which direct participation in radical nationalist politics entailed. He realized that as a businessman he had his family’s business interests to safeguard, and this realization influenced his subsequent involvements” p. 38, [14]. She also opined, “ From his early experience of the Rodda conspiracy case, he had learnt the lesson that a direct confrontation with the government would jeopardize his career and his commitment to strengthening the interests of Indian Big Business in their struggle against foreign capital” p. 128, [14]. Birla has himself written later: ‘Having involved myself with the terrorists of those day, I once got into serious trouble and had to go ‘under ground for nearly three months. The intervention of some kindly friends saved me from prison. It must be said, however, that I never had a great taste for terrorism, and after my contact with Gandhiji whatever traces remained were altogether eradicated.’ p. xv, [12].
Truth be told, after the Rodda incident, G. D. Birla showed only unmitigated hostility to revolutionaries and their support system in Congress. He also gained access to the highest echelons of the British political establishment and enjoyed their trust, which is unusual for those with past revolutionary associations. One wonders if that had anything to do with his long, close association with Charles Tegart. To assess this association, some particulars about Tegart are in order, which we source from an article written by Michael Silvestri, a Visiting Assistant Professor at Clemson University, South Carolina [26]. Tegart was an Irishman who was employed lifelong in British imperial service and displayed “ a fierce loyalty to the British crown, and an animosity towards those—Irish or Indian—who sought to break ties with the British Empire.” He was “a hated villain to Bengali revolutionary nationalists for his intelligence work against their cause.” He viewed Bengali revolutionary movement as “cowardly and evil”, and “gave less credence to nationalistic sentiment than did other intelligence officers.” His opinions were based on “widely-held British racial assumptions about Bengalis”. “Terrorism, he argued, arose from the dysfunctional dynamics of Bengali society and was based on ‘perverted religion and equally perverted patriotism’. The physique of the Bengali, a ‘non-martial race’, was ‘inferior’, and such ‘intensely sensitive and emotional beings’ were easily manipulated by terrorist leaders”. He was appointed as acting deputy commissioner of police in Calcutta in 1906. Since then he became “closely involved in the suppression of Bengali revolutionaries dedicated to overthrowing British rule.” In 1913, that is only a year before the Rodda heist, he joined the newly-established intelligence branch of the Bengal police. As part of his intelligence work, he “helped gather information that led to large-scale detentions and deportations of suspected revolutionaries under the 1915 Defence of India Act.”. Former Congress President Annie Besant accused Tegart of “slapping and punching terrorist suspects and of showing one revolutionary his revolver and threatening to shoot him.” Notwithstanding his denial and absolution by a commission appointed by the government of Bengal, even his fellow officers admitted that his police methods were ‘unconventional and dare-devil’ and that he would resort to ‘circumvention of law and procedure to achieve results’. Even as a senior officer he relished leading raids on the headquarters of revolutionary groups. For example he carried out an illegal attack comprising of a group of heavily-armed British police officers in the middle of night to capture a number of participants of the Chittagong armoury raid who had taken refuge in the French enclave of Chandernagore [26]. A study of Birla reveals that he shared many of Tegart’s views about the British and the Bengal revolutionaries. Tegart’s intelligence operations relied on information he received from a large network in Bengal, and he never revealed any source. Nothing is known about any specific services Birla may have offered to Tegart, beyond his close association with him since 1914 and that he hired Tegart after he retired.
Section E.2: Passive opposition to the revolutionary freedom movement- G. D. Birla’s support for the repressive Rowlatt Act
On 18 March, 1919, British Government of India enacted the repressive Rowlatt Act to contain the revolutionaries. It essentially suspended all civil liberties. It gave the government emergency powers during peace time – the right to arrest, search and imprison any person without trial or trial in special courts as necessary p. 188, [25]. Publication, distribution, or mere possession of material deemed seditious could invite incarceration up to two years [25]. Agitation against this act broke all over India. Marwaris enthusiastically participated in the Satyagraha in Kolkata. G. D. Birla’s close personal associate, Debi Prasad Khaitan, spoke at a protest meet. But Birla kept aloof focusing on business pp.40-41, [14]. Later he defended the act as: “For the Rowlatt Act was merely the taking of emergency reserve powers `in case’.’’ p. 235, [12]. Coincidentally, the Rowlatt Act was based on the recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee and Charles Tegart had served as one of the principal advisors to the Rowlatt Committee [26].
Section E.3: Active hostility to the revolutionary freedom movement: stint in the Bengal Legislative Council as British Governor’s Marwari nominee
In 1921, the Governor of Bengal, nominated G. D. Birla to the Bengal legislative council, passing over other Marwari stalwarts from Calcutta like Sir Badridas Goenka. Birla was only 27 year old then, and was preferred as he was popular with the younger generation of Marwaris and could be relied upon to keep them in check, given his aloofness during the Rowlatt agitation and his family’s large donation to the British war funds p. 59, [14]. Bengal governor Ronaldshay wrote to Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India: “The Marwaris are great supporters of Gandhi and are consequently inclined to support his policy of non-cooperation. They are very orthodox and very emotional and easily carried away by a man like Gandhi who promises them the disappearance of Western civilization and a return to the golden days of Hindu supremacy in the land. They are very wealthy as you know and can help the non-cooperationists very considerably in the matter of finance. Among the older men there is a considerable body which views with disfavor the present day tendency of the younger members of the community to throw in their lot with the political extremists and Ghanshyamdas Birla is a capable representative of this body.’’ p. 59, [14]. This is remarkable given Birla’s earlier revolutionary links as British never trusted those who opposed them even once in some meaningful form. The exception for Birla suggests he may have made serious amends in the interim period, which we are not privy to, to have redeemed himself in the British establishment world.
In the council, G. D. Birla usually voted with the official bloc. For example, in April 1921, he supported an official motion to give a supplementary grant to the police for increasing its strength in the 24-Parganas district (police was then launching barbaric atrocities on common non-cooperation agitators) p. 60, [14]. Incidentally, he had supported ham-handed tactics of British police throughout the freedom fight. On 4th February, 1939, for example, he objected when Gandhi admonished an English police officer for manhandling another business magnet, a Congress Working Committee member and a mutual friend of both Gandhi and Birla, Jamanlal Bajaj: “I again disagree with Bapu about the words “organized goondaism’’ and “barbarous’’ used about what Young did…..even when they removed him forcibly, when he refused to sit in the car, Damodar himself says publicly that Young had asked his men to lift Jamanlalji “very carefully’’. ….I also wonder how this would change the “heart’’ of Young or his superiors.’’ p. 239, [13].
In January 1922 G. D. Birla resigned from the Bengal Legislative Council due to pressing business commitments p. 64, [14]. Kudaisiya also notes: “Moreover, he felt that someone else who was willing to play a more active role could better serve the interests of the Marwaris in the Bengal Council”. Marwari Association nominated his trusted lieutenant, and the ‘shining light’ of M/s Birla Brothers, Debi Prasad Khaitan, to succeed him. Kudaisiya notes: “Although Khaitan had been an active participant in the Rowlatt satyagraha, he was, by 1922, a committed constitutionalist and continued Birla’s policy of whole-heartedly supporting the reforms” p. 64, [14]. Khaitan strongly supported the government in his maiden speech. In words of Kudaisiya, “He opposed proposals to refuse financial measures to compel the government to release C. R. Das and other imprisoned non-cooperators. During the council debate on the Bengal Amusements Tax Bill, the opposition advocated the defeat of the measure as a way of protesting against the government’s repressive policy” p. 81, [14]. It is worthwhile to note that C. R. Das had supported the revolutionaries from within the Congress. Khaitan’s move to keep him behind the bars shows how hostile Birla was to the revolutionaries.
Section E.4: Seeking to isolate the revolutionary freedom fighters from the mainstream – Gandhi-Irwin Pact and Beyond
On 5 March 1931, Gandhi signed the Gandhi-Irwin pact with Viceroy Irwin. That pact played “Divide and Rule” between nonviolent and revolutionary political prisoners, providing amnesty to the former specifically excluding: “(a) The state prisoners and ‘detenus’ imprisoned without trial, of whom there were about one thousand in Bengal alone (b) Prisoners convicted of revolutionary offenses (c) Prisoners under trial for alleged revolutionary offenses …(g) Prisoners sentenced in connection with the civil-disobedience movement, the charges against whom referred to violence of some sort “ p. 231, [1]. Thus, Bhagat Singh, Rajguru, Sukhdev who had already been sentenced to death by hanging before the pact was negotiated, convicted of a revolutionary offense, were excluded from the pact. They were executed on 23 March, 1931, that is, within three weeks of the signing of the pact. After their execution, Gandhi affirmed that: “We must realize that commutation of the sentences was not a part of the truce. We may accuse the Government of violence but we cannot accuse it of breach of the settlement.’’ p. 293, [10]. On26/03/1931, Gandhi said in a press interview, “ I must confess that the staying of these executions was no part of the truce” pp. 301-302, [10].The pact therefore sent the trio to gallow. The sense of betrayal that the revolutionaries felt at the pact has been expressed by Manmathnath Gupta, an eminent member of Bhagat Singh’s organization, as follows: “Gandhi was always eager to show that the life of the Viceroy was dearer to him than that of say, Jatin Das, or Bhagat Singh. This was perhaps a pose and a part of his strategy, but it hurt the revolutionaries who had been rotting in jails for years. The agents of the alien government called us terrorists. This did not hurt us, but Gandhi’s attitude amounted to almost saying, `You fellows are not political prisoners’. What annoyed us very much was that Gandhi was not consistent in his denunciations. He recognised the revolutionaries of all other countries as patriots, but he was more than step-motherly towards Indian revolutionaries, as evinced by the fact that he did not press for the release of revolutionaries at all on this occasion.” pp. 322, [11]. G. D. Birla had commended this pact for striking “ at the roots of the method of securing political advance by means of disorder,’’ and substituting it by “the method of mutual discussion and confidence.’’ p. 161, [12].
We now provide some background on the negotiation of the Gandhi-Irwin pact, and the role of Indian big business, particularly G. D. Birla, in it. In January, 1931, about two months before the pact was inked, Gandhi was unconditionally released from jail p. 129, [14]. Birla immediately went to Allahabad to see him and press for conciliation with the British. Kudaisiya has written, “Not having met the Mahatma for several months, Birla rushed to Allahabad to see him. There are no records available of what transpired but it appears that Birla pressed for conciliation. After his early talks with Gandhi, Birla informed Thakurdas [another big businessman] that there were good prospects for peace, although he felt some issues which Gandhi might raise could present difficulties” p. 129, [14]. The Viceroy, Lord Irwin, reported to the Secretary of State, Benn, that both Birla and Thakurdas were ‘working very hard ..to get Gandhi to be reasonable.’ Birla and Thakurdas were discussing terms of the pact with the two signatories: Gandhi and Irwin. Kudaisiya has written: “While in Allahabad, Birla was trying to get Gandhi to bid for peace, in Delhi, Thakurdas was discussing with Irwin the possibilities of resolving issues such as salt and the picketing of liquor and foreign cloth shops. Lord Irwin was delighted to find that Birla and Thakurdas were working in earnest to persuade Gandhi” p. 129, [14]. Irwin wrote to the Secretary of State, ‘it is I think significant that he [Birla] and Purshotamdas should be busying themselves to the extent they are in the cause of peace” p. 129, [14].
Once inked, FICCI, of which G. D. Birla was President in 1930 p. 125, [14], and Thakurdas a founding member (in 1927), “hailed the Gandhi-Irwin Pact as a distinct landmark in our history, a signal stage in the building up of our national constitution and a pact that every member of the commercial community in India will be grateful for.” p. 129, [14]. Kudaisiya also notes, “Similar sentiments were echoed by Indian chambers of commerce all over the country” p. 129, [14]. Incidentally, Birla remained central to the operation of FICCI throughout 1930s and beyond. He was one of the three representatives FICCI elected to attend the Second Round Table Conference p. 129, [14]. But, British government excluded him from their list of invitees. FICCI carried out a long correspondence on the issue with the government, threatening to boycott the conference. Their representation to the newly arrived Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, warned: “if any agreement is arrived at the Round Table Conference in the absence of the representatives of the Federation such agreement will not be binding on the Indian mercantile community”. FICCI saw Birla’s omission as a governmental attempt to undermine his stature” p. 130, [14]. So FICCI’s enthusiastic endorsement of the pact was also Birla’s (and Thakurdas’).
It however needs to be mentioned that the Gandhi-Irwin pact was approved in Karachi Congress, through use of party machinery, despite opposition from political prisoners. Subhas Chandra Bose has written about the pact: “Of all the Provinces Bengal was most hostile to the Pact, but even there, there was a party led by the late Mr. Sengupta pledged to support the Mahatma…Before my release from the prison, on March 8th [1931], I ascertained that political prisoners as a rule, were hostile to the pact, and I naturally shared their feelings. But after coming out I realized that the Pact was a settled fact and that there was no possibility of preventing its ratification at the Karachi Congress.’ p. 224, [1]. His account continues: “the official party machinery had worked with great thoroughness and from all the provinces supporters of the Pact had been elected as delegates in large numbers….At Karachi it was quite clear that they [opponents of the pact] would not have much support from the elected delegates who alone could vote at the Congress-though among the general public and particularly the youth-they had larger support. …..If we were defeated, as we were sure to be, our opposition would be futile. …..After duly weighing all these considerations, we decided that a statement should be made to the effect that the Left Wing of the Congress did not approve of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, but that in view of the circumstances prevailing at the time, they would refrain from dividing the House. The statement was made by me before the Subjects Committee of the Congress and was received by great jubilation by the supporters of the Pact, while it caused disappointment to our more enthusiastic supporters.’’ pp. 227-229, [1].
Revolutionaries like Manmathanath Gupta had found one of the core tenets of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact particularly humiliating, that they would be deemed terrorists, rather than political prisoners, unlike the non-violent freedom fighters. This terminology and distinction was an article of faith for G. D. Birla. He has referred to “terrorists” and “terrorism” in alluding to his short stint with revolutionary freedom fight (p. xv, [12], reproduced in the penultimate paragraph of Section E.1). He has written in the same book that he urged Viceroy Linlithgow to arrive at a common position with Gandhi on “terrorists’’ and get rid of “terrorism’’ altogether pp. 164, 174, [12]. In a note to Lord Linlithgow, likely in the summer of 1935, he advocated the distinction between non-violent political prisoners and “terrorists”, restoration of the clauses of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact and made a subtle distinction between Subhas Chandra Bose who was never committed to non-violence and his elder brother Sarat Chandra Bose who was an ardent constitutionalist: “After the new Viceroy has established personal contact some points are bound to crop up for consideration, and I am putting them forward so that your mind may seek the solution.(1) Release of non-violent political prisoners. (There are not many but there are some, like Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Pandit Nehru. The latter probably will be released very soon).(2) Return of the confiscated land. This point was conceded in the Irwin-Gandhi Pact, but with the breakdown of the pact everything receded into the background. Congressmen would find it difficult to enjoy office while leaving their co-workers in the lurch. (3) The question of terrorists will have to be solved. Some scheme will have to be found to get rid of terrorism effectively. On this point the Congress and Government are on common ground, but their methods are not common. The Congress want to kill terrorism more by confiscation than by punishment. While the Congress should not exclude punishment from their modus operandi, the Government, in my opinion, should not exclude the method of reconciliation. I visualise the creation of common ground for the Government and the Opposition and thereby a way to meet terrorism effectively. The release of Mr. S. C. Bose is a step in the right direction, and I think his brother Mr. Subhas Bose, too, could be handled properly. It would not be beyond the ingenuity of Sir John Anderson to find a formula. I am writing all these things for your consideration, because some day you will have to give serious attention to these matters and you may like to think ahead” pp. 164-165, [12].
(The note was left after Gandhi-Irwin Pact and just before Linlithgow took over as Viceroy and while Birla was in England, probably left in the summer of 1935) . Thus, Birla remained committed to the pact and its core tenets several years after it was signed.
G. D. Birla continued to mediate between Gandhi and the British towards isolating the revolutionary freedom fighters.On 30th June, 1935, he told Home Member Sir Henry Craik that if the British does not arrive at a settlement with Gandhi, “a revolution of the bloody type may become an inevitable factor. And this would be the greatest calamity not only to India but to England. Tories may say this would be India’s funeral. I say it would be a funeral for both.’’ p. 132, [12]. This remark shows Birla’s fear of a revolution. On August 7, 1936, Birla wrote to Lord Lothian, “The whole question is, “Should we make a serious effort to direct the energies of India once for all towards constitutional channels?” ” p. 270, [16]. Birla had informed Lord Lothian on March 31, 1937: “I know Gandhiji’s mind definitely and can assure you that he, without any reservation, wants to put a stop to any kind of direct action once for all.’’ p. 337, [18].
G. D. Birla’s satisfaction with the Gadhi-Irwin pact can be further evidenced in the warmth he retained for Lord Irwin, as opposed to his successor Lord Willingdon (who had excluded him from officially participating in the second round table conference). On 22 April 1938, he wrote in an article in the Friend, The Quaker Weekly Journal, Vol 96, No 1, “the policy of personal contact established by that most noble Viceroy, Lord Irwin (now Lord Halifax) and broken by Lord Willingdon, creating so much bitterness in India against England and Englishmen, has again been established by Lord Linlithgow” p. 172, [14]. The pact that signed the death warrant of the revolutionary trio of Bhagat Singh, Sukhdeb, Rajguru, and penalized revolutionaries as a whole, raised Birla’s stature in the British political establishment. Kudaisiya has written, “ By now [1937] Birla enjoyed easy access to important figures in the British political establishment. Many British politicians looked upon him as a personal emissary of Gandhi. Moreover, they regarded him as a conciliator who could be relied upon to work sincerely for the success of the new constitution. This perception of Birla in British political circles went back to the moderating influence he was believed to have exercised upon Gandhi in 1930-1 at the time of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. …. Birla, therefore, enjoyed an impeccable reputation in London and many British politicians regarded him as an insider in the Gandhian establishment and were more than willing to lend him a serious ear.” p. 172, [14].
Section F: G. D. Birla orchestrated the expulsion of Subhas Chandra Bose from National Congress
We had earlier documented how through his influence on Gandhi, in 1938 G. D. Birla stopped Subhas Chandra Bose from felling the Muslim League Ministry in Bengal headed by Fazlul Huq. We now show that in 1939 he engineered the effective expulsion of Subhas Chandra Bose from Congress again through his influence on Gandhi and Patel. Kudasiya posits that this was because Bose had urged Congress to adopt an uncompromising agitational path against the British, while Birla wanted Congress to be more conciliatory towards the Raj. He also saw Bose as a threat to the Gandhian wing of the Congress, which is where his influence lay. Kudasiya records: “Birla was critical of Bose’s general attitude towards the Gandhian wing of the Congress, and much more after his election to the Congress Presidentship in 1937. At his Presidential speech at the Haripura Congress Session, Bose had urged the agitational path and had wanted the Congress to take an uncompromising attitude towards the Raj. This went against the creed which Birla propounded and had tried so hard to achieve in the last few years. Moreover, Bose’s speech came just at a time at which Birla was very anxiously trying to resolve the UP ministerial crisis and was urging both the Congress and the Raj to be conciliatory. He intensely disliked Bose’s speech and saw it as yet another threat to Gandhi and the right-wing within the Congress. The ideological debates that followed the Haripura session and the factional differences that openly surfaced within the Congress deeply disturbed him…..Throughout 1938-9 Birla kept a close watch on the activities of the leftists (the faction of Congress that Bose belonged to).’’ pp. 175-176 [14].
G. D. Birla’s correspondence with Gandhi’s secretaries and Patel show that he had counseled, may even have instructed them, about the approach they must follow vis a vis Bose. The secretaries regularly briefed Birla about what transpired in meetings between Gandhi and Bose.
- In 1939 as Congress President, Bose, wanted to deliver a six month ultimatum to British Government to leave India. G. D. Birla was staunchly opposed to it. So he kept a close watch on Bose’s moves and particularly his meetings with Gandhi. On February 18, 1939, Birla wrote to Gandhi’s secretary, Pyarelal, “I am expecting to hear from you the outcome of Subhas’s interview with Bapu. From what I have heard about it – and the source of information is reported to be Subhas Babu himself – it appears that Bapu has insisted on his choosing his own Cabinet and carrying out his own programme of giving six months’ ultimatum and then starting a fight. I am not quite sure what would be the consequence of all this. It is clear that he alone cannot carry on the fight. And I dare say Bapu cannot help him in such a fight so long as he remains unconvinced of the necessity of the same. But would it then mean leaving the field free to him. I am sure Bapu has a plan in his mind.’’ pp. 247-248, [13]. So Birla was sure that Bose alone would not be able to fight the British, and counseled Gandhi to stop Bose from utilizing the Congress forum to carry on his vision of the ultimatum. He is also keen that Bose does not get the field free to do the same.
- On 20th February, 1939 Pyarelal dutifully informed G. D. Birla about Bose’s meeting with Gandhi: “Subhas was here, closeted with Bapu for three hours. The report that has appeared in the press is substantially correct. As I wrote to you before, Bapu’s outspoken advice fell absolutely flat on him. He is out for personal adventure. I wonder where the crew on whose shoulders he has mounted to his Presidential chair will lead him. It is a dangerous crew. But Bapu hopes that if he can rightly put into operation the whole technique of non-violence, it will be well with the Congress and the country. In the mean time an intriguing is likely to arise in the next A.I.C.C. meeting which it is learnt is by majority likely to vote for sanity. Confabulations here are still proceeding. You will know everything in a day or two. ’’ p. 187, [14], p. 251, [13]. So Gandhi and his wing had hatched plans to obstruct and later remove a democratically elected Congress President well in advance of the Tripuri Congress in March 1939 and Pyarelal dutifully kept Birla in the loop. They already knew that majority would vote to show a lack of confidence in Bose in Tripuri. Pyarelal also assured Birla that the previous Working Committee would not cooperate with Bose’s vision of delivering the ultimatum to Britain, and they would resign en masse: “I find that an assiduous attempt is being made in a certain section of the Press to create an impression that there was some sort of “understanding’’ or ‘’compromise’’ arrived at between Bapu and Subhas Bose as to the future programme of the Congress. If this implies any manner of acquiescence or agreement on the part of Bapu as to the policies that Bose is professing to advocate, it is altogether erroneous and misleading. Bapu made absolutely clear to Bose that he could not expect any kind of co-operation in his new policies from the members of the old cabinet. But Bapu may not issue a statement to counteract this propaganda at the present juncture, as it is likely to be misunderstood and exploited by interested parties…..Members may, however, address him a letter to say that they are ready with their resignation as soon as he is ready to accept them.’’ pp. 252-253, [13]. Congress Working Committee members indeed acted exactly as Pyarelal informed Birla.
In Tripuri Congress, majority voted for a resolution that constrained President Bose to form a Working Committee as per the directions of Gandhi, which was a no confidence on him. Subsequently Gandhi refused to discuss the Working Committee with Bose. The stalemate forced Bose to resign from Congress Presidency. Subsequently he formed a bloc within Congress known as Forward Bloc, and formed a left consolidation committee together with Congress Socialist Party and Communist Party of India. He also toured India to campaign against cooperation with British. All these were deemed an open revolt by Congress Right Wing, which included the Gandhians, and infuriated Birla and Vallabhbhai Patel.
Kudasiya writes: “ As the rift in the Congress Working Committee widened and the right-wing leadership was faced with an open revolt by Bose (who was elected president of Congress, twice), he (Birla) was convinced that the time had come for the right-wing to assert its control. The increasingly defiant stand of Bose after the Congress session at Tripuri and his formation of the Forward Bloc led Birla to impress upon Patel that there was now no alternative except to take disciplinary action. He (Birla) was clear that Bose’s revolt could not go unpunished and strict action must be taken. The best course, he advised Patel (on 15 July, 1939) was to convene a special session of the Congress rather than let the AICC (All India Congress Committee) take disciplinary action. `If you take disciplinary action without going to the country’, he cautioned Patel, “it will help Subhash to become a martyr and perhaps it may eventually weaken your hands’’. ‘’ p. 176, [14]. Patel replied (on 18 July, 1939): “I do not think there is any cause for going to Congress as a whole. In such matters proper course is for the Working Committee to deal with the situation and whatever Bengal may do or feel we cannot afford to ignore this defiance. It would mean certainly the end of Congress” p. 187, [14]. We note that Birla decided that the twice elected President of Congress, Bose, had to face disciplinary action, and Patel concurred, regardless of what Bengal may do or feel. This shows how deeply the duo resented Bose, and how dismissive Patel was about Bose’s main support base.
Within three weeks of the above correspondence, G. D. Birla reminded Gandhi’s new secretary Mahadev Desai of the need to discipline Bose. Three days after Birla’s letter Desai sent a compliance report stating that the Working Committee was unanimous about disciplining Bose. A day after Desai’s letter, Bose was effectively expelled from Congress. On August 7, 1939, Birla wrote to Mahadev Desai, “I am not quite sure what would be the result of disciplinary action if the Working Committee so acts. I have been receiving contradictory opinion on this point but I personally believe that you cannot allow the things to continue as they are doing at present.’’ p. 326, [13]. He was referring to disciplinary action against Bose. On August 10, 1939, Desai responded to Birla that “Every member of the W.C. wants disciplinary action against Subhas’’ p. 327, [13]. On August 11, 1939, the Congress Working Committee adopted a resolution, drafted by Gandhi, debarring Bose from the office of the President of Bengal Provincial Congress Committee or any other elective post for the next three years pp. 226-227, [27], p. 228, [5]. Kudasiya has recorded the relief Birla felt at the above development: “In August 1939 Bose was disqualified from the president-ship of the Bengal Congress and debarred from the membership of any elective Congress Committee for three years. This came as a relief to Birla.” p. 176, [14].
On August 14, 1939, G. D. Birla gleefully reported to Desai that he sent a contingent from his Calcutta stronghold to welcome Dr Bidhan Chandra Roy upon his return from the Congress Working Committee meeting in which the disciplinary action against Bose was decided upon: “Bidhan [B. C. Roy] reached here [from attending the CWC meeting where Bose was debarred] this morning and he was disappointed if he had expected that he would meet at the station a procession of black flags. On the contrary, about 2000 men from Burrabazar went to receive him’’ (Burrabazar was, and still is, a Marwari stronghold and a business region in Calcutta) p. 228, [5], pp. 328-329, [13]. Bose took digs at Gandhi’s money power without naming Birla on Aug 19, 1939: “The line of least resistance and the path of opportunism however takes one straight to the rightist camp. ….There you find men who never went within miles of a British jail. You find multi-millionaires who pose as patriots, because they can call themselves Gandhiites. What are the Zemindars, industrial magnates and multi millionaires who now hang about our Congress ministers if not opportunists ?’’ p. 11, [2].
G. D. Birla continued to undermine Bose even afterwards. Political circles believed that he was running Matribhumi, just in order to crush a Bengali daily, Anand Bazar Patrika, whose circulation then exceeded that of any other daily in whole of India. On December 27, 1940, Desai informed Birla of this prevailing belief p. 188, [18]. On December 30, 1940, Birla denied that he had to do anything with Matribhumi, and added, `Whether it is conducted to compete with Anand Bazar Patrika or to oppose Subhas, I do not know. But perhaps the latter is the object.’’ p. 191, [18].
Subhas Chandra Bose’s expulsion from Congress was a hugely consequential decision. Devoid of the Congress platform, his associates facing the ire of the Raj, he could not launch a nationwide mass movement potent enough to oust the Raj. He decided to leave India and strike from abroad. The Azad Hind force he led sowed the seeds of rebellion in the British Indian Army with the consequence that India became ungovernable for the British, and they handed over power in 1947. But Subhas himself could not return to his beloved motherland, he was never heard of after a reported air crash in 1945. But British transferred power only after partitioning India which had a huge human cost. Partition was decided on negotiation table between Britain, Congress and Muslim League, utilizing Muslim communalism and their stubborn demand for partition as a convenient excuse. But what if transfer of power could be forced through a mass movement like the one that Subhas Chandra Bose envisioned in 1938-39? Would British still have the power to insist on partition before they left? This may have been possible if Congress, at the beck and call of G. D. Birla, did not deny platform to its twice elected President. As we will see in the sequel that partition was a policy decision which Birla aided British to attain and pressurized Congress to accept. Congress won a huge Hindu mandate in 1946 general election promising that it would avert partition. Yet, it meekly acceded to partition right after at the insistence of Indian big business spearheaded by Birla. It never launched a mass movement to stop partition, such a movement would have drawn out Hindus in large numbers, and given their numerical superiority a large scale participation from them could have countered Muslim communalism and stopped partition. Such a mass movement launched in 1905 reversed the British policy decision to partition Bengal. Surely its success at a national level can not be ruled out. But it was never called by Congress. This is what Subhas Chandra Bose would probably have done had he been in India when partition was being decided, particularly given his stringent opposition to partition from Germany and Japan while he could be heard. This is the prospect Birla denied India by successfully maneuvering Congress to expel Subhas Chandra Bose. Bengal was one of the worst sufferers of partition of India given the large scale human displacement and lack of support from Government of India in refugee rehabilitation. Thus through his political maneuvers Birla brought enormous suffering upon Bengal.
References:
[1] S. C. Bose, The Indian Struggle (1920-1942)
[2] `The Alternative Leadership, Speeches, Articles, Statements and Letters’, June 1939-1941 Subhas Chandra Bose, Netaji Collected Works, Volume 10
[3] LETTER TO SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE, December, 1938, Seagaon, Wardha http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/VOL074.PDF
[4] JB Kripalani , Gandhi His Life and Thought
[5] Suniti Ghosh The Tragic Partition of Bengal
[6] Subhas Chandra Bose, Congress President Speeches, Articles and Letters, January 1938-May 1939, Netaji Collected Works, Vol. 9
[7] V N Datta, “Gandhi and Bhagat Singh’’, Rupa Publishers, 2008.
[8] Saswati Sarkar, Shanmukh, Dikgaj,Mahatma Gandhi’s war on Indian revolutionaries http://www.dailyo.in/politics/mahatma-gandhis-war-on-the-indian-revolutionaries-british-nehru-mountbatten-sardar-patel/story/1/5359.html
[9] Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj – Biography of Indian Nationalists, Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose
[10] Collected works of Mahatma Gandhi, Gandhi Interview to the Press, 26/03/1931, http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/VOL051.PDF
[11] Manmathnath Gupta, `They Lived Dangerously’
[12] G D Birla In the Shadow of the Mahatma
[13] Ghanashyam Das Birla, “Bapu – A unique association’’ Vol. 3
[14] Medha M. Kudayisya “The Life and Times of G D Birla’’
[15] C. Markovits, “Indian Business and Nationalist Politics”
[16] G D Birla “Bapu – A unique association’’ Vol. II
[17] K. M. Munshi, Pilgrimage to Freedom
[18] G D Birla “Bapu – A unique association’’ Vol. IV
[19] – Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, , Gandhi’s letter to GD Birla, 08/05/1929 http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/VOL045.PDF
[20] – ibid, Gandhi’s letter to GD Birla, 26/08/1929 http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/VOL046.PDF
[21] – ibid, Gandhi’s letter to GD Birla, 18/09/1929, http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/VOL046.PDF
[22] – H. V. Seshadri, “The Tragic Story of Partition”
[23] – Rajendra Prasad, “India Divided ”
[24] Acharya Prafulla Chandra Ray, “Life and Experiences of a Bengali Chemist”, Part I
[25] https://www.britannica.com/event/Rowlatt-Act
[26] https://historyireland.com/feagh-mchugh-obyrne-2/
[27] CONGRESS WORKING COMMITTEE RESOLUTION, August 11, 1939, http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/VOL076.PDF
[28] Shyamaprasad Mookerjee, “Leaves from a Diary”